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Abstract  
The current development agenda envisages a substantial increase in volumes of development assis-
tance along with changes in other policies which affect developing countries, including trade, debt 
and migration. Successful and sustainable international development cooperation policies and ex-
penditures are believed to require a constituency for aid in donor countries. The paper explores the 
question of how public support for international development cooperation in donor countries can 
be built and nurtured. It attempts to identify factors which determine public attitudes towards de-
velopment assistance and measures that can be undertaken by state authorities to exploit these fac-
tors to the advantage of a greater support for development cooperation. It reviews rationales and 
arguments which can be used to explain to the publics of donor countries the need of transferring 
a part of their national income to developing countries. It also presents approaches which have 
been developed by donors in order to enhance public understanding of the need for development 
cooperation and to strengthen support for development assistance.  
Keywords: international development cooperation, public opinion, public involvement, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), new donors. 
Resumen 
La actual agenda de desarrollo internacional prevé un substancial incremento de volúmenes de 
ayuda al desarrollo, junto con cambios en las demás políticas que afectan a los países en desarrollo, 
tales como la política comercial, de deuda y de migración, entre otras. Unas exitosas y sostenibles 
políticas de cooperación al desarrollo requieren, como se supone, la existencia en los países donan-
tes de una ciudadanía que reclama la ayuda al desarrollo. En este artículo se investiga la cuestión 
de cómo impulsar y fomentar en los países donantes el apoyo público a favor de la cooperación al 
desarrollo. Se pretende identificar los factores que determinan las actitudes de los ciudadanos en 
cuanto a la ayuda al desarrollo, así como las medidas que las autoridades públicas pueden imple-
mentar con el fin de aprovechar dichos factores para conseguir un mayor apoyo público a la coope-
ración. Se revisan argumentos que se pueden empelar para explicar a los ciudadanos de los países 
donantes la necesidad de transferir una parte de su renta nacional a los países en desarrollo. Ade-
más, se presentan enfoques empleados por los donantes para facilitar la comprensión de la necesi-
dad de cooperación al desarrollo, así como para aumentar el nivel de apoyo público a la ayuda al 
desarrollo. 
Palabras clave: cooperación internacional al desarrollo, opinión pública, participación pública, 
Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD), nuevos donantes. 
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Introduction 
The current development agenda envisages a 
substantial increase in volumes of assistance 
directed from the wealthier part of the world 
to developing countries with a view to enhan-
cing their development efforts. The challenge 
is encapsulated in the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) – a global plan to decisi-
vely reduce extreme poverty in all its key di-
mensions – which are derived from the Millen-
nium Declaration, adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in September 2000. By 
agreeing to the Goals, the international com-
munity assumed co-responsibility for attaining 
a greater global cohesion. Goal 8 calls on the 
need to develop global partnership for deve-
lopment, which should include creating better 
trade and financial conditions for development 
and providing more generous development as-
sistance.1  
By underwriting the Monterrey Consensus, 
agreed at the UN Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 
2002, developed countries committed to gra-
dually increase volumes of development assis-
tance, to ultimately attain the long-standing 
target of 0.7% of donor-country national inco-
me.   
These commitments were reaffirmed by the 
European Union in May 2005, when the 
Council agreed on reaching by 2010 a collec-
tive aid target of 0.56% of members’ national 
income and accepted a corresponding schedu-
le of aid increments. The timetable obliges the 
EU-15 member states to achieve a level of 
0.51% ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. 
The new member states are obligated to strive 
to increase their ODA up to 0.17% of national 
income by 2010 and up to 0.33% by 2015.2  
                                                 
 
 
1 Unless explicitly indicated, the terms aid, development aid, de-
velopment assistance, foreign aid, and ODA are used inter-
changeably to refer to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). 
In line with the definition by the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) of the OECD, ODA means technical assistance, 
grants or loans to developing countries (i.e. countries specified 
on the DAC List of Aid Recipients) which are undertaken by the 
official sector at concessional financial terms with the main ob-
jective of promoting economic development and welfare.  
2 As of 2005, the average for UE-15 was 0.44% ODA/GNI and for 
EU-10 it did not exceed 0.1 % ODA/GNI. For figures on ODA 
spending by particular countries see appendix 2.  
Along with quantitative aspects, the global de-
velopment cooperation agenda foresees chan-
ges in an array of policies affecting develop-
ment, including trade, debt and migration. It 
also calls for reforming aid instruments and 
management systems. All this with the aim of 
improving aid effectiveness and generating 
more suitable conditions for development.  
However, the challenge that the donor com-
munity faces goes beyond figures, numbers 
and better administrative procedures. Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that successful and 
sustainable development cooperation policies 
and expenditures require a constituency for 
aid in donor countries. Expanding aid pro-
grammes and budgets not only should be ma-
de known to the citizens but they also need to 
be understood and approved of. Otherwise, 
effectiveness of development policy may be 
endangered due to policy incoherence – e.g. if 
aid policy is contradicted by trade policy – and 
unreliable levels of funding. Ideally, support 
for development cooperation should come 
from a public sense of “ownership” of aid poli-
cies – i.e. a genuine identification with its ends 
and means.  
The aforementioned task will be particularly 
demanding for newcomers to the donor com-
munity, such as the new member states of the 
UE. While still benefiting from incoming aid 
funds, these countries are at the very begin-
ning of the process of recognition of their do-
nor status. As the governments in new donor 
countries steadily increase aid budgets, to ma-
ny of their citizens it does not seem obvious 
that their countries should assist others.  
Public understanding of aid policies may ap-
pear more difficult seeing the anticipated gra-
dual adoption of more sophisticated aid instru-
ments3 and delivery mechanisms.4 While these 
are expected to enhance aid effectiveness, they 
also imply lesser aid visibility and weakening 
of a discernible link between donor societies 
and beneficiary communities in recipient 
countries.  
This paper explores the question of how pu-
blic support for development cooperation in 
                                                 
 
 
3 Such as e.g. programme aid, Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) 
or General Budget Support, instead of project-based assistance.  
4 Such as e.g. delegated cooperation or trust funds.  
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donor countries can be built and nurtured. It 
seeks to identify factors determining public at-
titudes towards development assistance as well 
as measures that can be undertaken by state 
authorities to exploit these factors to the ad-
vantage of a greater support for aid. It attempts 
to find reasonable and convincing arguments 
which can explain to the public the need of 
transferring a minor part of the national inco-
me to developing countries. It also intends to 
depict what approaches can be developed to 
enhance public support for development coo-
peration.  
Chapter one addresses the question of relevan-
ce of public attitudes for development coope-
ration. It explains what public support for de-
velopment cooperation actually stands for, 
how it is revealed and how it can be measured. 
The chapter clarifies why public support is 
needed in this policy field. It gives the profile 
of public attitudes towards aid, concentrating 
on the publics of the EU countries and results 
of public opinion surveys. It also reviews rela-
tionships between public support for aid and 
the volume of aid expenditures and examines 
assorted socioeconomic, political and histori-
cal determinants of aid allocations. 
Chapter two deals with possible justifications 
for aid from the point of view of public sup-
port. It presents the major development chal-
lenges of today’s world that call for more vi-
brant international cooperation, including de-
velopment assistance. It outlines the main ar-
guments which give explanation for why the 
societies of developed countries should contri-
bute to global poverty reduction and assist 
poorer countries in their development efforts.  
Chapter three explores measures that can be 
taken by donors to build and foster support for 
development aid. It reviews concepts, policies 
and instruments which have been developed, 
mainly within development cooperation pro-
grammes, with a view to raising public aware-
ness of international development policies and 
programmes and thus facilitating understan-
ding of development issues among societies of 
donor countries.  
The final conclusions of this paper point to 
major considerations to be taken into account 
when tackling the problem of building public 
support for development cooperation. These 
include the conditions which shape public at-
titudes towards development assistance, the 
most convincing and realistic arguments that 
can be used in the short and medium term to 
communicate the need for a greater aid effort 
as well as promising vehicles for conveying the 
message on development cooperation. Lastly, 
obstacles and opportunities for generating and 
strengthening support for development aid     
– with a special focus on the conditions of new 
donor countries – are identified.  
 
 
1. Public Support and official 
development assistance  
The analysis presented in this paper rests on 
the assumption that citizens’ consent is indis-
pensable for a substantial and lasting increase 
in development aid expenditures to come 
about and that such consent can be generated 
by undertaking deliberate measures to this 
end. The reasoning behind this assumption 
draws from the logic of political decision-ma-
king in democratic societies: increased aid le-
vels and more coherent development coopera-
tion policies require political will; political will 
is built through wide and sustained political 
support, which comes from the support base, 
that is voters. However, as it will be explained 
in the following paragraphs, the relationship 
between aid allocations and the position on aid 
and other development policy choices is more 
complex. This chapter explores the merit of 
public support for development assistance, 
presents the overall profile of donor countries’ 
public attitudes towards aid and attempts to 
determine what factors are decisive in shaping 
public sentiments on the matter.  
 
1.1. KEY DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT 
FOR AID 
To begin with, it is important to consider what 
public support for development aid actually 
stands for and how it is manifested. Firstly, 
people in donor countries contribute to deve-
lopment cooperation through paying taxes. 
Regardless of one’s attitude to development as-
sistance, a part of his or her contribution to 
the state budget is spent on financing official 
aid programmes and other development-rela-
ted cooperation policies undertaken by go-
vernments on behalf of the citizens. Customa-
rily, as in many other policy fields, citizens’ 
support for these governmental efforts is gau-
ged by public opinion polling.  
In theory, support for development coopera-
tion could also be expressed through regular 
mechanisms of political accountability practi-
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ced in democratic societies. This is of course 
subject to the condition that development coo-
peration is a part of party programmes, that 
voters take it into account when marking the 
ballot and that it is possible to distinguish this 
factor as more decisive than others. In reality, 
however, in electoral campaigns development 
cooperation is overshadowed by other, mostly 
domestic, policy concerns.5 
Secondly, people contribute to development 
cooperation through their attitudes and indi-
vidual decisions and choices made in the pri-
vate sphere of life. Donations to Non-Govern-
mental Development Organisations (NGDOs) 
can serve as a proxy for public attitudes 
towards development cooperation (USAID 
2002).6 In addition, one can make non-finan-
cial contributions to the works of NGDOs 
through volunteering. There is no doubt that 
spending money or time on something is 
much more meaningful and concrete than me-
rely expressing opinion about it. Yet active 
participation and involvement of individuals 
goes beyond donating time: one can contribute 
his or her ideas and criticism, for example by 
engaging in the public debate. The spectrum of 
individual informed decisions that have to do 
with development issues also includes ethical 
consumer behaviour, such as purchase of fair 
trade goods.  
 
1.2. IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR 
AID POLICY 
Before entering into a more detailed analysis, 
consideration needs to be taken of why public 
attitudes towards development cooperation 
should matter to policy makers. Two major 
reasons for relevance of citizens’ engagement 
in this policy field can be distinguished (Mc-
Donnell et al. 2003; Fransman and Solignac 
Lecomte 2004). 
First, in democratic countries, public aware-
ness and understanding of public policies are 
                                                 
 
 
5 As it will be explained further on, support for development 
cooperation in electoral processes is possibly expressed in a mo-
re indirect way.  
6 USAID (2002) uses the volume of the US private assistance, 
which includes contributions from foundations, NGOs, trade 
unions, universities and colleges, and religious congregations, in 
addition to corporations and private remittances, to prove that 
the aid effort made by US society is far bigger than that gauged 
only by ODA.  
desirable per se. A legitimate and effective de-
mocracy requires participation and active in-
volvement of all citizens. In addition, it is im-
portant for political accountability to taxpa-
yers. As regards international development, 
the public in donor countries benefit from the 
assistance given to developing and transition 
countries (further discussed in 0). Thus the 
public are “shareholders” in the sense that it is 
their taxes that finance aid programmes and 
their elected representatives who formulate 
and monitor realisation of aid policies. The 
“return” the public receive on this investment 
is greater prosperity and human security 
throughout the world.  
Second, public engagement has an instrumen-
tal value to formulation and implementation of 
aid policies. International solidarity and gene-
rosity demonstrated by the public clearly indi-
cates that it can provide a precious input and 
impetus in favour of more vigorous, coherent 
and efficient international development coope-
ration policies. Development cooperation is 
not an exclusive responsibility of govern-
ments. Civil society organisations, especially 
NGDOs and trade unions, already offer inva-
luable expertise and relevant ideas and have an 
important function in the implementation of 
development policies. The role of local govern-
ments and the business sector in this regard is 
growing. Conversely, lack of public engage-
ment and awareness of the reasoning behind 
these policies is likely to cause resistance, to 
impede their sustainability and effectiveness as 
well as to obstruct mobilisation of new resour-
ces to finance them.  
 
1.3. THE PROFILE OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS AID IN DONOR COUNTRIES 
Using opinion polls as a measure of public 
support for aid and development cooperation 
and as a basis for international comparisons 
has certain limitations. Opinion polls give in-
formation on purely declarative support: they 
attempt to measure public support for the 
principle of giving aid in general and people's 
satisfaction with the levels of ODA. Most com-
monly, the data is based on responses to ques-
tions asking: “Do you favour the provision of 
aid to poor countries?” or “Do you think it is 
important for your country to help poor coun-
tries?” (McDonnell et al. 2003; Fransman et al. 
2004). Polls rarely deliver information on un-
derlying attitudes and values and on preferable 
directions of aid. In addition, polls usually ne-
glect people's approach to policy issues going 
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beyond aid, for instance trade, debt and immi-
gration policy. 
Smillie and Helmich (1998) observe that pu-
blic interest in helping people in need and 
support for ODA are not necessarily equiva-
lent. They explain that people may not have an 
attitude towards development cooperation but 
they have a clear attitude towards poverty re-
duction, yet they do not see ODA as a strategy 
to achieve it. In a similar vein, Fowler (1997: 
133) makes a point about the temperature of 
aid funds. He differentiates between hot mo-
ney donated to NGOs for child sponsorship in 
response to a particular appeal, which comes 
from individual concern and is loaded with 
personal warmth and expectations, and cold 
multi-million tax money going through nume-
rous bureaucratic procedures to finance multi-
lateral and bilateral aid programmes, and hit-
herto deprived of personal human attachment.7 
In effect, surveys hardly ever distinguish bet-
ween different types of donor agencies, such as 
international organisations, national govern-
ments and NGOs. Respondents tend to asso-
ciate the United Nations and NGOs with “hel-
ping agencies” and to found their judgements 
on the most visible activities of aid agencies, 
that is to say those which attract media atten-
tion, either positive or negative (Box and Krui-
ter 1997).  
Finally, poll-based data is believed to be not 
sufficiently reliable and systematic to allow for 
viable international comparisons. Poll findings 
depend not only on the wording of the ques-
tions, which is not uniform across countries, 
but on other circumstances as well, for exam-
ple the particular point in time when the sur-
vey is carried out (Fransman et al. 2004).8 
Comparable data on the practical support for 
aid, such as donations to NGOs or consumer 
behaviour, is even more limited. Therefore, the 
analysis presented here is based primarily on 
the declarative expression of attitudes towards 
aid, gathered in national polls and in Euroba-
rometer survey. A special Eurobarometer sur-
                                                 
 
 
7As a matter of fact, Fowler (1997: 133) points to a somewhat 
warmer character of bilateral funds, as opposed to highly anony-
mous and impersonal multilateral aid, because they are destined 
to a discernible country and population.  
8 Poll results can be largely biased for example when surveys 
coincide with humanitarian emergencies in developing counties, 
caused by natural disasters or conflict, which are often accom-
panied by public appeals for humanitarian assistance.  
vey is undertaken every four years at the re-
quest of the European Commission in order to 
measure public support for international coo-
peration in the European Union.  
 
1.3.1. Current levels of support for aid by 
donor country 
According to the most recent Eurobarometer 
survey (2005), 91% of EU citizens can be un-
derstood to support development aid (see Fi-
gure 1). As already highlighted, this data refers 
to the principle of giving aid to poorer coun-
tries. It is based on a question about percep-
tions of importance of helping people in poor 
countries to develop and is calculated as a sum 
total of responses judging such help to be “ve-
ry important” and “fairly important”.9 Even 
though the level of the aggregate perception of 
importance may seem high, a breakdown of 
the responses by the strength of the conviction 
shows (Figure 2) that only 53% of EU citizens 
take a strong stance on aid (responding “very 
important”) and as many as 38% of EU citi-
zens are more reluctant supporters (respon-
ding “fairly important”). 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the breakdown of 
the responses, as opposed to relying on the 
overall proportion of those believing in impor-
tance of development aid, is also more instruc-
tive in identifying in which countries people 
are most and least supportive of aid. In Cy-
prus, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Malta Ireland, 
Italy, Poland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and 
Greece, the overall perception of importance 
of aid exceeds the EU average of 91%. Nonet-
heless, as in the case of Italy, Netherlands and 
Poland, this does not necessarily correspond 
with high levels – i.e. above or much above the 
EU average of 53% – of strong conviction on 
the matter. The highest proportions of strong 
positive feelings about the importance of aid 
are to be found in Sweden and Cyprus, follo-
wed by Malta, Luxemburg, Greece, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
                                                 
 
 
9 The exact wording of the question: In you opinion, is it very 
important, fairly important, not very important or not at all im-
portant to help people in poor countries in Africa, Latin Ame-
rica, Asia, etc. to develop? (Eurobarometer 2005). 
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Figure 1 
Support for aid in the European Union: overall perception of importance of helping 
poor countries to develop 
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SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005). 
Figure 2 
Support for aid in the European Union: perception of importance of helping poor 
countries to develop broken down by the strength of the conviction 
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SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005). 
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1.3.2. Trends in public support 
Conclusions from various opinion polls indi-
cate that support for development aid is not 
only high but also generally stable among the 
publics of donor countries (Stern 1998; Smillie 
and Helmich 1998; McDonnell et al. 2003).  
Data from the consecutive waves of Eurobaro-
meter surveys on attitudes towards develop-
ment aid (see Figure 3) show a sharp increase 
in perceptions of importance of aid in the first 
half of the 1990s (from 80% in 1991 up to 95% 
in 1995), which was followed by a decline in 
the second half of the 1990s (reaching a low of 
76% in 1998). The trend has been reversed 
since then and a steady increase in the recog-
nition of the importance of development aid 
can be observed. 
  
 
 
Figure 3  
Evolution of public support for aid in the European Union 
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SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005). 
 
 
The dent in the level of public support for aid 
in the European Union in the second half of 
the 1990s corresponds with the marked decli-
ne in aid volumes by OECD donors in the sa-
me period (see Figure 4).10 The so-called “aid 
fatigue,” as the phenomenon was baptized, 
was to be associated with public disillusion 
with development aid on account of its inef-
fectiveness. However, there is evidence contra-
dicting the hypothesis of the “aid fatigue” or 
“compassion fatigue” among the public.11 Ha-
                                                 
 
 
10 This decline in aid volumes was partly due to the diversion of 
aid funds from the poorest countries to the former communist 
countries, of which many –particularly those located in Europe– 
do not qualify as ODA recipients (White 2002). 
11 The term “aid fatigue” originally referred to public disillusion 
with humanitarian aid and only later was extended to the alle-
ving examined thirty public opinion surveys, 
Stern (1998) observes that support has not 
dropped in comparison with 15 years before 
and even rose slightly. The fall in levels of 
ODA observed until 2001 was not matched by 
a decline in donations from the public to hu-
manitarian and development NGOs. Quite the 
opposite, the public turned out to be increa-
singly generous. Likewise, grants from NGOs 
were more stable than official aid flows to 
developing countries (White 2002; McDonnell 
et al. 2003; Fransman et al. 2004).  
                                                                         
 
 
ged overall reluctance towards development aid in general (Mc-
Donnell et al. 2003). 
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Figure 4 
Evolution of ODA levels in OECD countries 1960-2003 
SOURCE: DAC/OECD on-line database.  
 
There are a few possible explanations of this 
sustained financial support for NGOs’ efforts 
in the development field. It may mean that 
NGOs are preferred suppliers of development 
programmes, ahead of governments. Besides, 
the 1990s saw an upsurge in disasters and 
wars which received real-time media coverage, 
thus generating a convincing appeal for aid to 
the public (McDonnell et al. 2003).12  
However, the data on high levels of public 
support for development aid has to be conside-
red with caution and seen in the context of 
other policies of interest to the public. As a ge-
neral rule, aid is not given high priority among 
public concerns. The public is inclined to give 
higher consideration to their domestic pro-
blems in the first place, especially domestic 
poverty and economic affairs (Smillie and Hel-
                                                 
 
 
12 Smillie and Helmich (1998: 26) observe that while some 
NGOs in some countries have registered a drop or a slowdown 
in donations growth, in general, donations for international de-
velopment and emergency work during the 1990s have not 
declined for larger organisations. They explain that declines for 
smaller NGOs were likely to be a loss of “market share” to larger 
mainstream “brand-name” NGOs, rather than a sign of “compas-
sion fatigue“. 
mich 1998; Stern 1998).13 In addition, aid 
ranks low among foreign policy priorities 
(Stern 1998).  
 
1.3.3. Public awareness of aid and 
development cooperation 
Another reason for reservation towards data 
on public support for development aid comes 
from low public awareness of official aid, deve-
lopment cooperation policies and development 
issues in general. As Ian Smillie once put it, 
“Public support is a mile wide and an inch 
deep.”14  
 
1.3.3.1. Awareness about official aid 
First, only two thirds of citizens of the former 
EU-15 group and two in five in the ten new 
Member States realize that their governments 
                                                 
 
 
13 Smillie and Helmich (1998) comment, however, that the pu-
blic bias towards dealing with domestic issues does not preclude 
public support for the principle of poverty reduction and for 
promoting development in other countries. 
14 Quoted in Smillie and Helmich 1998.  
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provide aid to developing countries (Euroba-
rometer 2005).  
Second, people tend to overestimate their go-
vernment's aid effort substantially. Approxi-
mately 40% of Europeans declare not to know 
how much their government spends on foreign 
aid. Another 40% estimate aid volumes to be 
between 1-4%, 5-9% or more than 10% of the 
state budget. Only the smallest proportion as-
sess the aid level to be less than 1% (Euroba-
rometer 2003), whereas, in fact, rates vary bet-
ween 0.20% and 0.96% of GDP. In the same 
way, a majority of Americans wrongly think 
that about 20% of the federal budget is spent 
on foreign aid (Fransman and Solignac Lecom-
te 2004). Most Americans believe that the level 
of government spending on aid is comparable 
to expenditures on social security and medical 
care (Smillie and Helmich 1998: 22). 
  
1.3.3.2. Humanitarian and emergency aid bias 
Third, as a general rule, the vast public sup-
port for foreign aid is based upon the erro-
neous belief that it will be spent on remedying 
humanitarian crises (Fransman and Solignac 
Lecomte 2004). This widespread association of 
development aid with humanitarian assistance 
is largely due to the nature of coverage that de-
veloping countries receive in the media. The 
media, principally television, followed by 
print, is the primary self-identified source of 
information on developing countries among 
the publics of OECD countries (about 80% on 
average) (McDonnell et al. 2003). The media 
focus on war and famine, especially characte-
ristic of television, tends to overshadow all 
other development-related issues. Given the 
often shallow and sensationalistic coverage of 
affairs of developing countries, dominated by 
negative images of disaster and conflict, the 
media bear a part of responsibility for one-di-
mensional perception of development aid and 
partial understanding of development issues 
among the public. 
  
1.3.3.3. Awareness and understanding of 
development issues 
Fourth, another indication of low awareness of 
development issues and the challenges of de-
velopment cooperation comes from polls pro-
bing people’s familiarity with the MDGs. The 
MDGs clearly set out key dimensions of extre-
me poverty and bind the signatories of the UN 
Millennium Declaration to decisively reduce 
poverty to concrete targets. They represent the 
global anti-poverty consensus and constitute a 
framework for measuring development pro-
gress. However, public awareness of this deve-
lopment challenge is very low. Four years on 
since their adoption, as many as 88% of EU ci-
tizens declare not to have heard of the MDGs. 
The highest levels of awareness were registered 
in Sweden, Italy and Austria (27%, 19% and 
18% respectively), where government-led or 
civil society-led MDG campaigns took place. 
Also worth noting is an overall low confidence 
in the achievement of the goals.15 For each 
goal, one in ten or less respondents believe the 
goal will “definitely” be achieved by the set 
date. The prospects for the attainment of the 
primary goal of reducing extreme poverty and 
hunger are met with scepticism of more than 
two thirds of EU citizens (Eurobarometer 
2005).  
Notwithstanding this gloomy picture, the lite-
rature on public awareness of development is-
sues also points to a number of positive signs 
in this regard. McDonnell et al. (2003) observe 
that despite the emergency aid bias in public 
perception of aid and a lesser focus on other 
issues that add up to the agendas of donors 
(namely access of poor countries to Northern 
markets, reform of agricultural policies, educa-
tion and capacity building, gender equality, 
environmental sustainability, etc.), there is evi-
dence of an increasing recognition of non-aid 
policies such as international trade, debt relief 
and good governance in recipient countries as 
solutions for poverty reduction.16 McDonnell 
and Solignac Lecompte (2002) highlight a gro-
wing consciousness of the need for poverty re-
duction and a significant single-issue (occasio-
nally in-depth) awareness. This particular awa-
reness essentially refers to issues such as debt 
relief, fair trade, environmental sustainability 
or taxation of international financial flows (the 
Tobin Tax), which have been advocated for in 
well-targeted campaigns led by the NGO com-
munity and supported by opinion leaders and 
the media. 
                                                 
 
 
15 The respondents were asked about their confidence in the 
achievement of the goals upon being briefed on the origin of the 
MDGs and the underlying objective being to improve the lives of 
people in developing countries by the year 2015 (Eurobarometer 
2005). 
16 The conclusion is based on data from the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the Netherlands (McDonnell et al. 2003). 
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 1.3.4. Arguments against aid 
The main argument of the small segment of 
the EU-15 public opinion not supportive of 
development aid resides in a higher priority 
attached to solving problems of domestic po-
verty, unemployment and of the economy. 
Suspicion that aid will be detoured and, ins-
tead of reaching the neediest, will benefit cor-
rupt governments is the second most frequent-
ly given justification against aid. It is followed 
by a conviction that, before receiving aid, poor 
countries should stop fighting and buying 
arms. Excessive cost of aid and scepticism that 
aid is not conducive to the improvement of the 
situation in poor countries are pointed to by 
somewhat lower proportions of respondents 
(Eurobarometer 2003). 
  
1.3.5. Motives and supported objectives of 
aid  
As it has already been established, public atti-
tudes towards development cooperation are 
characterized by a humanitarian bias. Poll re-
sults indicate that humanitarian concerns        
–particularly famine, starvation, malnutrition, 
war and conflict – are only second in impor-
tance to environmental concerns and take pre-
cedence before all other dimensions, such as 
poverty and global inequalities, international 
trade, governance or democracy issues (Mc-
Donnell et al. 2003).17 These findings corres-
pond with the most popular objectives of fo-
reign aid indicated by Stern (1998), namely 
health care, basic needs, disaster assistance, 
and protecting the environment. Stern also 
finds that people tend to more approve of aid 
to needy developing countries than to (former) 
strategic allies and tend to favour neighbours 
over the distant poor.  
A strong appeal of humanitarian and emergen-
cy aid and a greater disposition to help the 
neighbours should come as no surprise, given 
that people are more inclined to support a cau-
se with which they can identify and which can 
be easily translated into their daily lives. Vague 
concepts, such as poverty reduction, are met 
with reluctance and do not find fertile ground 
unless converted into clear messages and bac-
                                                 
 
 
17 On the basis of UNFPA and MORI survey Population Issues in 
the Developing World: 1996 and 2001 Public Opinion Research 
in 13 European countries, quoted by McDonnell et al. 2003. 
ked by a concrete objective. Lessons learnt 
from campaigns – such as the Jubilee 2000 
Campaign (for Third world debt cancellation), 
land mines, MDGs – indicate that tangible ex-
pected results and a feeling of making a diffe-
rence are more likely to get public support 
(McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte 2002). Aid 
is met with sympathy when it is seen as di-
rectly contributing to reducing human suffe-
ring. It is also observed that even though mo-
ral and humanitarian reasons predominate, 
there is also a growing recognition of self-inte-
rest as an additional motive (Smillie and Hel-
mich 1998).18 
  
1.4. IMPACT OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON AID 
POLICY 
Having seen the profile of public attitudes to-
wards aid, let’s now consider the role of public 
opinion in aid policy-making. It is reasonable 
to expect that in democratic societies public 
preferences would be accounted for by policy 
makers who decide on aid allocations. In fact, 
the relationship between public support and 
government expenditures on ODA is found to 
be a very complex one (McDonnell et al. 
2003). By analyzing cross-country data, Stern 
(1998) finds the relationship to be positive and 
especially strong among the Nordic countries 
– Denmark, Norway and Sweden – and the Ne-
therlands. This conclusion – and thus the hy-
pothesis about direct influence of public opi-
nion on aid policy – is challenged by findings 
from longitudinal analysis based on both glo-
bal and single-country data. By contrasting ge-
nerally high and stable average levels of sup-
port for aid with overall declining volumes of 
ODA (as percentage of GDP) in OECD coun-
tries, McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte (2002) 
contest the positive correlation. The elusive 
character of the relationship is further confir-
med by evidence from particular countries 
where fluctuations in ODA and the level of 
support were going in different directions 
(Norway, Canada) or where no corresponden-
ce was observed (UK).  
                                                 
 
 
18 Self-interest is understood here as a recognition of effects of a 
growing interconnectedness among remote societies; it means 
understating of consequences of the development gap to the 
well-being of people in the developed world.  
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McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte (2002) ar-
gue that it is due to shallow public awareness 
and understanding about global development 
and poverty issues, that public opinion fails to 
influence policy making in this area. Without 
in-depth knowledge about development issues, 
the public is thought to be incapable of articu-
lating its support by undertaking effective ac-
tions to exert pressure on decision-makers.  
Olsen (2000) explains that a possible link 
between public opinion and development aid 
should be considered in a broader context of 
foreign policy-making. As regards foreign poli-
cy, decision-making is confined to an elite of 
political leaders and their advisors. The public 
is easily influenced and manipulated by their 
opinions and attitudes, because it is more con-
cerned with domestic issues than with interna-
tional affairs, of which is has a limited know-
ledge. Given that development cooperation be-
longs to foreign policy, mechanisms of deci-
sion-making on aid follow the same top-down 
pattern and take little account of general pu-
blic’s preferences. In particular, a weak link 
between the government and the public in this 
policy field consists in centralisation of deci-
sions on aid, limited involvement of parlia-
ments (scarce debates on development coope-
ration) and NGO monopoly on dialogue with 
the government.  
Furthermore, an analysis of the changing deve-
lopment cooperation policy in the United 
Kingdom led to the conclusion that the in-
fluence of public opinion resides in providing 
a basic political context within which deve-
lopment is seen as important, rather than in 
determining the outcome of particular policy 
debates (ODI 2003). 
 
1.5. DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT 
FOR AID  
Finally, consideration has to be given to how 
public attitudes towards development coopera-
tion are formed and what forces are relevant to 
the process. Research into the matter relies on 
cross-country comparisons –taking into ac-
count people’s attitudes, historical back-
grounds of societies and their socio-economic 
arrangements– as well as on analysis of socio-
demographic data and declared values and opi-
nions (measured by polls) within a single 
country. A few clusters of possible explana-
tions for people’s stance on foreign aid can be 
distinguished. 
 
1.5.1. Economic factors 
There is a reasonable assumption that people 
enjoying economic well-being, high levels of 
income and an optimistic economic outlook 
would be more willing to share their resour-
ces. Having analyzed correlations between ra-
tes of public support for aid and three indica-
tors of economic well-being, namely GDP 
growth, unemployment rate, and the health of 
domestic public finances (budget balance), 
Stern (1998) finds the relationships not to be 
significant, thus proving this hypothesis to be 
false.  
More specifically, the positive correlation bet-
ween support for aid and unemployment rates 
pointed to a stronger support in countries with 
higher unemployment rates. The weak negati-
ve correlation between support for aid and the 
health of public finance indicated a stronger 
support in countries with fiscal deficits.19 The 
correlation between support for aid and real 
GDP growth rates was found to be weak, sug-
gesting only marginally stronger support at ti-
mes of economic prosperity.  
However, evidence from longitudinal studies 
from a number of countries shows a stronger 
influence of perceptions of economic well-
being on attitudes towards maintaining or in-
creasing levels of aid and point to a lessening 
support in bad times or in a sentiment of eco-
nomic crisis. In Sweden, for instance, support 
for aid tends to increase when Swedes expect 
their economy to perform better and falls 
when the economic prospects are more pessi-
mistic. It has been observed that support for 
aid dropped when the Swedish government 
announced budget cuts because of macroeco-
nomic difficulties (McDonnell et al. 2003: 
202).  
The conclusion on the non-decisive character 
of economic conditions in donor countries in 
relation to support for aid can be further sup-
ported with examples of countries such as 
Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, which in the 
1990s were considered to be low-income do-
nor countries, yet strong supporters of aid. A 
higher disposition to international solidarity in 
                                                 
 
 
19 Stern (1998) further explains that larger fiscal deficits may be 
linked to a larger public sector role in a society and therefore 
greater public support for public assistance both at home and 
abroad.  
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Ireland, Spain and Greece may arise from their 
own history of poverty, famine and conflict 
(McDonnell et al. 2003). Another possible rea-
son for sympathy towards giving aid in these 
countries may be their recent status of reci-
pients of external resource transfers (i.e. from 
the EU budget) (Stern 1998).  
 
1.5.2. Openness to and dependence on 
foreign trade 
Another possible explanation is derived from 
potential effects of country’s openness to fo-
reign economic influences. It could be expec-
ted that a bigger role of foreign trade in the do-
mestic economy would result in a greater pu-
blic concern for the social, political and econo-
mic welfare of other nations. Testing the hypo-
thesis with two proxies of exposure to interna-
tional trade, that is a country’s level of trade 
dependence (the value of export and imports 
against GDP) and tariff levels revealed a weak 
positive relationship with rates of support for 
aid in both cases. This leads to the conclusion 
that dependence on and openness to interna-
tional economic exchange may only marginal-
ly contribute to a bigger support for aid (Stern 
1998). 
  
1.5.3. Social values and long-term socio-
economic choices 
Furthermore, development cooperation policy 
can be perceived as an international projection 
of donor-country domestic policies, particular-
ly redistribution mechanisms that characterize 
the organisation of social relations (Noël and 
Thérien 1995). In line with this reasoning, pu-
blic attitudes towards aid should be rooted in 
social values and reflect a vision of the society 
that people want to live in. Aid generosity of 
Nordic countries and their commitment to 
welfare society give good reason for the as-
sumption that societies concerned with do-
mestic solidarity, equity and the welfare of the 
disadvantaged should be more supportive of 
international aid.  
Social and institutional arrangements identi-
fied by Stern (1998) as instrumental in pro-
bing this assumption include: domestic inco-
me equality, level of social spending, size of 
government, and equity of foreign aid alloca-
tions.20 Indeed, according to his findings, do-
mestic income equality and the size of the go-
vernment sector in relation to the overall eco-
nomy appear to be strongly correlated with 
support for aid: societies where the income 
gap between the rich and the poor is smaller 
and where government expenditure as percen-
tage of GDP is higher turn out to be more sup-
portive of aid. The level of government spen-
ding on programmes such as social security 
and welfare (as percentage of GDP) and the 
degree to which donor country aid program-
mes target the neediest countries are also rele-
vant, but less significantly. 
  
1.5.4. Awareness of official aid and 
development cooperation policy 
It has been already highlighted in point 0 that 
people’s knowledge about official aid is gene-
rally low and superficial. Yet studies carried 
out by Fransman and Solignac Lecomte (2004) 
find evidence on its significance for public atti-
tudes: the more people are aware of aid and 
development cooperation policies, the more 
they are supportive of them. It was found that 
in donor countries which succeeded in main-
taining the levels of ODA in the 1990s, the pu-
blic had been made aware about the develop-
ment cooperation programme and the justifi-
cation for it (McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte 
2002). Nordic countries are renowned for the 
level of their ODA spending and their societies 
are believed to be best informed on the issue 
by their respective governments. For instance, 
owing to an active and sustained information 
and communication policy by the Danish go-
vernment, more than nine in ten Danes recog-
nize DANIDA as the agency for development 
cooperation and more than a half of them cor-
rectly estimate the percentage bracket of ODA 
(McDonnell et al. 2003). In the Netherlands, 
public debate on aid brought about a greater 
scepticism about its effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
it did not lead to a diminished support but 
rather to strengthened support that is more 
critical (NSC 2005). 
                                                 
 
 
20 Equity of foreign aid allocations is understood as the degree to 
which donor country aid programs target the neediest countries, 
based on per capita income.  
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However, international cooperation is held to 
be a non-transparent policy area (McDonnell 
and Solignac Lecompte 2002). With the afore-
mentioned notable exception of the Nordic 
countries, efforts of development agencies in 
donor countries to inform and educate the pu-
blic about official aid programmes are conside-
red to be generally insufficient: they are often 
limited to publishing annual reports and ma-
king official statements in the form of press re-
leases to announce increases in ODA volumes 
and are usually poorly funded (McDonnell et 
al. 2003). 
  
1.5.5. Interest in and awareness of 
development issues 
Further statistical evidence points to a strong 
relationship between support on the one hand 
and interest in and awareness of development 
cooperation on the other: people who believe 
in the importance of development cooperation 
are strongly interested in global development 
issues and have a good knowledge of problems 
occurring in developing countries. Conversely, 
people who are indifferent towards develop-
ment policy show low or no interest in deve-
lopment issues and poor knowledge of pro-
blems of developing countries. Similar findings 
come from analysis of demographic determi-
nants of public opinion: younger, better educa-
ted and urban-dwelling respondents tend to be 
more aware and supportive of development 
cooperation (McDonnell et al. 2003).  
It would be convenient at this point to consi-
der how interest in development problems is 
generated. It is reasonable to assume that the 
degree of interest in and the level of unders-
tanding of development issues are related to 
people’s interest in international affairs in ge-
neral. In addition, historical conditions such as 
donor-country colonial past, coupled with 
links with former colonies, may stimulate a 
better understanding of international reality 
and poverty questions. Then, exposure to de-
velopment issues through receiving immi-
grants may play a role. Finally, what is espe-
cially relevant for this analysis, interest in de-
velopment issues may result from the impact 
of deliberate government policies to this end. 
In effect, it has been found that higher levels of 
public spending on development education 
and aid-related information activities corres-
pond with better awareness and higher ODA/ 
GDP ratios (further discussed in 0) (Edwards 
2002; European Conference 2005; McDonnell 
et al. 2003). 
1.6. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER ONE 
The literature reviewed for the purposes of the 
foregoing analysis does not give conclusive 
evidence of a direct relationship between pu-
blic attitudes towards aid in donor countries 
and the level of expenditure on official aid 
programmes. Intensity of foreign commercial 
exchange and economic well-being appear not 
to be decisive for support for foreign aid. Sup-
port turns out to be related to domestic social 
arrangements: donor societies with higher in-
come equality and higher levels of public spen-
ding are more supportive of development coo-
peration. Lastly, disposition to help poorer 
countries depends on knowledge about go-
vernment development assistance programmes 
and general awareness of development issues: 
support is higher among people with better 
knowledge in these areas. 
 
2. Aid justified  
Why to be concerned with the fate of people 
elsewhere in the world? In the name of what, 
should people in developed countries resign 
from a part of what they –individually and col-
lectively– have been working for and transfer 
it to where development achievements have 
been less significant? This chapter presents 
major rationales for such international trans-
fers. It focuses on justifications which seem to 
be most relevant for building public support 
for development assistance and which may ser-
ve as promising arguments in the debate on 
the place of emerging donors in the aid sys-
tem. With a view to situating the analysis in 
the context of today’s realities, discussion on 
the justifications is preceded by an overview of 
major world problems of today.  
 
2.1. WORLD DEVELOPMENT TODAY  
2.1.1. Global poverty and inequity 
Results of monitoring progress on the realisa-
tion of the Millennium Development Goals, a 
development agenda to which leaders from all 
over the world committed on behalf of the ci-
tizens of their countries, present a gloomy pic-
ture of world development achievements: 
“Extreme poverty remains a daily reality for 
more than 1 billion people who subsist on 
less than 1 dollar a day. Hunger and malnu-
trition are almost equally pervasive: more 
than 800 million people have too little to 
eat to meet their basic energy needs. For 
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young children, the lack of food can be pe-
rilous since it retards their physical and 
mental development and threatens their ve-
ry survival. More a quarter of children un-
der five in developing countries are mal-
nourished” (The Millennium Development 
Goals Report 2005). 
Efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger are of-
ten hindered by natural disasters and conflict. 
Hunger and poverty, in turn, easily lead to 
conflict, especially when combined with ine-
quality. Out of 13 million deaths in large-scale 
conflicts in 1994-2003, more than 12 million 
were in Sub-Saharan Africa and Western and 
Southern Asia. Just five diseases –pneumonia, 
diarrhoea, malaria, measles and AIDS– are res-
ponsible for half of all deaths in children un-
der five. As of 2004, an estimated 39 million 
people were living with HIV/AIDS, of which 
25 million in Africa. AIDS has claimed 20 mil-
lion lives and reversed decades of development 
progress in worst-affected countries. Africa has 
12 million AIDS orphans. During the 1990s, 
extreme poverty dropped in a large part of 
Asia, fell slowly in Latin America, changed lit-
tle in Northern Africa and Western Asia, and 
rose and then began to fall in transition econo-
mies. But Sub-Saharan Africa, where the po-
verty rate was anyway highest, saw further de-
terioration: the number of people suffering 
hunger increased by 34% (The Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2005). 
 
Box 1 
Causes of poverty: reasons for failure in achieving the MDGs (UN Millennium 
Project 2005) 
 
Poor governance: lack of rule of law and unaccountable governments resulting in corruption and 
violence, inefficient administration, unsound economic policy choices, inappropriate public 
investments in education, health and infrastructure and inadequate support for science and 
technology, and denial of human rights.  
Poverty traps: local and national economies too poor (i.e. lacking fiscal resources and savings) to 
finance investments needed in infrastructure, social services, and public administration.  
Pockets of poverty: uneven progress which leaves some parts of an economy, or some parts of a 
society, behind. This is particularly relevant for large middle-income countries with considerable 
regional and ethnic diversity and evident in cities with a dual reality of great wealth and slums 
(Southern Mexico, Northeastern Brazil, Latin American cities).  
Areas of specific policy neglect: effects of policymakers’ unawareness of the challenges, their 
inability to address them, or from a deliberate disregard of core public issues (e.g. environment and 
gender). 
 
 
 
World progress has been uneven. In the se-
cond half of the twentieth century Western 
Europe, North America and Oceania experien-
ced rapid economic growth. In other regions, 
some countries which were initially lagging 
behind seized the economic opportunities re-
sulting from foreign investment and techno-
logical advance. Since the mid-1970s, GDP per 
capita quadrupled in East Asia. In Latin Ame-
rica and the Arab states gains were relatively 
modest. But at the turn of the past century in 
more than 80 countries income per capita was 
lower than at the beginning of the 1990s. Pre-
dicted convergence of income and trickle-
down effects from richer to poorer countries 
did not come about and inequalities increased. 
The income gap between the fifth of the 
world’s people living in the richest countries 
and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 
1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 
1960. By the late 1990s, the fifth of the world’s 
people living in the highest-income countries 
had 86% of world GDP, while the bottom fifth 
just 1%; 68% of foreign direct investment, whi-
le the bottom fifth just 1%; 74% of world pho-
ne lines, while the bottom fifth just 1.5%. 
Developing countries represent 85% of the 
world’s population but account for 93% of the 
world's disease burden and only 11% of global 
spending on health. Income inequalities wit-
hin countries have been also increasing for the 
past 30 years, impeding poverty reduction 
(UNDP 2000; UNDP 2002; World Bank). Ma-
ny large and populous middle-income coun-
tries, such as Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico 
and Russia, which are home to millions of the 
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world’s poorest, are highly polarized in both 
economic and social terms.21  
Explaining shortfalls in progress towards the 
achievement of the MDGs on the global scale, 
the UN Millennium Project (2005) points to 
four overarching reasons for hitherto failure: 
poor governance, poverty traps, pockets of po-
verty, and areas of specific policy neglect (see 
Box 1). The UK Commission for Africa (2005), 
while recognizing the relevance of history and 
geography for the lack of development in Afri-
ca, identifies four major groups of obstacles to 
development in this continent: political, struc-
tural, environmental and technological, and 
human (see Box 2). 
 
2.1.2. Globalisation and today’s threats and 
challenges 
The problem of global poverty and inequalities 
cannot be addressed without considering the 
changes in today’s world reality and the dri-
ving forces that shape current political, econo-
mic, and cultural trends which, combined, are 
commonly referred to as globalisation. Held 
(2000) defines globalisation as “a process (or 
set of processes) which embodies a transfor-
mation in the spatial organisation of social re-
lations and transactions, generating transconti-
nental or interregional flows and networks of 
activity, interaction and power.” In other 
words, globalisation involves fundamental 
changes in the spatial and temporal dimen-
sions of social existence, with far-reaching im-
plications for virtually every facet of human 
life.  
The spatial dimension of globalisation involves 
deterritorialisation, meaning that an increasing 
range of social activities occur irrespective of 
geographical location of the participants, as 
well as social interconnectedness, implying a 
growing impact of geographically distant 
events and decisions on people’s lives. The 
temporal dimension of globalisation entails ve-
locity and long-term character of the proces-
ses. It is often argued that the constitutive pro-
cesses of globalisation, namely flows of trade, 
capital, people and ideas, are by no means a 
sudden or a new phenomenon. What distin-
                                                 
 
 
21 Gini index for Brazil is 59.3, for Mexico 54.6, for China 44.7. 
By comparison, 25 for Sweden, 36 for the United Kingdom and 
40.8 for the US (World Development Indicators 2005). 
guishes the current globalisation is their recent 
acceleration. Compression of space and time, 
mutually reinforcing, are fuelled by unprece-
dented advances in transportation, communi-
cation and information technology.22  
From the perspective of international develop-
ment, several implications of globalisation 
seem to be especially relevant. Taking advanta-
ge of the opportunities offered by globalisation 
and consequent participation in its benefits 
has been highly disproportionate, thus enhan-
cing existing inequalities. Acceleration of the 
processes which used to be more gradual in 
the past made adaptation and adjustment dif-
ficult both for individuals and whole societies, 
leaving behind many world outcasts. National 
economies are increasingly more entangled 
with each other. A new global division of la-
bour is emerging, whereby fields of national 
and regional specialisation deepen rather than 
diminish disparate levels of the value added to 
the global output. Nation-states –both indivi-
dually and collectively, as intergovernmental 
organisations– thus far the main locus of po-
wer, are losing ground to non-state transnatio-
nal actors, including corporations and civil so-
ciety organisations. Decision-making on global 
affairs is more often taken through informal 
gatherings and summits outside the multila-
teral system. Despite the growing involvement 
of non-state actors in setting norms and stan-
dards, systems of regulation and control in 
such fields as trade, finance, and investment 
remain mostly national in scope, while their 
repercussions are transnational. As a result of 
increasing interconnectedness, security is no 
longer exclusively viewed as security of states 
but more as human security. 
                                                 
 
 
22 Held (2000) points to four features of globalization: extensity, 
intensity (growing magnitude), velocity, and deepening impact 
of activities, processes, and interactions. 
18 
Box 2 
Causes of poverty: obstacles to development in Africa (Commission for Africa 2005) 
 
Political: poor governance (looting of the resources of the state, bribery, underprovision of social 
services) and conflict.  
Structural: fragmentation, transport costs, dependence on primary commodities.  
Environmental and technological: low agricultural productivity, climate, water, desertification, 
deforestation, and technological development. 
Human: health, education, and the growth and age structure of population. 
 
  
Box 3 
Six clusters of threats to international security identified by the UN High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN 2004) 
 
Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental 
degradation 
Inter-State conflict 
Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities 
Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
Terrorism 
Transnational organised crime 
 
 
 
 
 
An approximation to the question of current 
global problems can be drawn from the chan-
ging concept of international security. The re-
cent UN call for a new security consensus, as 
presented in the report “A more secure world: 
our shared responsibility” delivered by the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, is based on a more comprehensive ap-
proach, which goes beyond international war 
and conflict and recognizes as a threat to inter-
national security “any event or process that 
leads to large-scale death or lessening of life 
chances and undermines States as the basic 
unit of the international system” (UN 2004). 
In line with this definition, contemporary 
threats to peace and security extend to civil 
violence, organised crime, terrorism and wea-
pons of mass destruction as well as poverty, 
deadly infectious disease and environmental 
degradation since their consequences can be 
equally extensive and catastrophic.  
The threats of today are interrelated and mu-
tually reinforcing: poverty is strongly associa-
ted with the onset of civil war and puts strain 
on the environment, leading to overexploita-
tion of natural resources.Environmental stress, 
brought about by overpopulation and shorta-
ges of land and other natural resources, is like-
ly to cause civil violence. Infectious diseases 
(such as HIV/AIDS and malaria) aggravate po-
verty. Environmental degradation intensifies 
exposure to diseases. Civil war debilitates sta-
tes, hampers economic growth, facilitates 
transnational organised crime and provides 
fertile ground for terrorism. Thanks to trans-
national criminal groups, access to weapons of 
mass destruction becomes easier. Illicit trade 
in arms and commodities fuels civil wars.  
Because of rising interdependence, vulnerabili-
ty to problems traditionally associated with 
poor countries is not confined to the develo-
ping world. Even the strongest economies are 
affected by weak national financial systems 
elsewhere. Vulnerability goes in the opposite 
direction, too. A terrorist attack on Europe or 
the United States can have adverse effects on 
people everywhere. Protection against threats 
in today’s world is beyond the capacity of a 
single state and requires international coope-
ration.  
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2.1.3. Aid – a crucial aspect of the response 
However questioned and criticized for its inef-
fectiveness and strings attached,23 foreign aid 
has proved to be effective and did render and 
facilitate unquestionable achievements in ma-
ny cases. The Marshall Plan, having cost the 
United States 1% of the annual national inco-
me for four years, was instrumental in recons-
tructing Europe after the Second World War. 
Smallpox was defeated by little more than 
US$100 million of targeted aid. Mozambique 
transition in 1991-1997 and subsequent dou-
ble-digit economic growth rates would not ha-
ve been possible without foreign assistance. 
Aid deserves merit for social sector improve-
ments in Tanzania and Uganda (Commission 
for Africa 2005; Sogge 2002; UN Millennium 
Project 2005). Aid by itself –without domestic 
reform in developing countries and accompan-
ying measures in international trade and debt 
policy– does not suffice to ensure develop-
ment. But it is necessary to assist development, 
particularly in the poorest countries, which 
cannot attract private direct investment and 
for which aid is the largest source of external 
financing (White 2002; UN Millennium Pro-
ject 2005).  
The UN Millennium Project (2005) argues 
that poverty can be much reduced within a few 
years if a number of simple measures with 
high potential for bringing short-term gains in 
people’s well-being are taken immediately. The 
so-called “quick wins” include, among others, 
eliminating school and uniform fees, distri-
buting free insecticide-treated bed-nets in ma-
laria-endemic zones, and regular de-worming 
of schoolchildren. The team headed by Jeffrey 
Sachs has calculated that developing countries’ 
domestic financing for these practical steps as 
well as for more comprehensive interventions 
leading to the MDGs will have to be matched 
by donors’ assistance amounting to US$135 
billion in 2006 and rising up to US$195 billion 
by 2015. The UK Commission for Africa 
(2005) estimates that the programme for re-
form in Africa it proposes, embracing gover-
nance, public investment and social spending, 
will cost an additional US$75 billion per year 
in overall public expenditure and will require 
an additional US$50 billion per year in aid.  
                                                 
 
 
23 See for example Sogge 2002. 
2.2. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AID 
2.2.1. Aid as a moral duty 
First and foremost, the basic and oldest fun-
damentals for giving aid are moral values, not 
allowing for indifference to human suffering. 
Arguably, the vast part of donations to NGOs, 
which are predominantly driven by compas-
sion for the disadvantaged, is a response to an 
inner moral duty and a manifestation of a sen-
se of personal obligation to lend a hand to tho-
se less fortunate.  
Religion, by tradition, has played a leading role 
in inducing empathetic attitudes. The catalo-
gue of moral norms of major monotheistic 
religions –Christianity, Islam and Judaism– in-
cludes clear obligations to assist the needy to 
the best of one’s capacity. Zakat (alms) is one 
of the five basic precepts of Islam. Originally 
thought as a compulsory care for the poor and 
hungry, widows and orphans, it turned into a 
sort of mandatory tax paid by Muslims all over 
the world. The second of the two basic Chris-
tian commandments summons to love your 
neighbour as yourself. The Social Doctrine of 
the Church teaches that solidarity and brother-
hood are laws given by God on the grounds of 
equal worth and dignity of all men, since each 
is God’s image. Nevertheless, the religious as-
pect of the moral argument may not have a 
universal appeal because of questionable exis-
tence of God as the creator of and the law-
maker for the human race.  
In addition, the moral duty, or more precisely 
moral debt, stems from the single historical 
process, pervaded by colonialism, genocide 
and slavery, which led to different social posi-
tions of the global scale. In this light, foreign 
aid is meant to compensate the massive 
wrongs which left some a lot worse off than 
others.  
Lastly, it can be argued that denial of aid 
means conscious inaction with regard to po-
verty, especially its extreme manifestations 
such as hunger and disease, and thus is ethi-
cally unacceptable.24 Pogge (2001) emphasizes 
that the developed world’s failure to make a 
serious effort towards poverty reduction may 
constitute not merely a lack of benevolence 
                                                 
 
 
24 Dubois (undated) indicates that the sheer definition of poverty 
delineates limits of what is socially unacceptable.  
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but an active impoverishing, starving and kil-
ling of innocent people by economic means. 
  
2.2.2. Aid as a manifestation of justice  
A second justification can be found in the pre-
mise of global justice. It is derived from Rawls’ 
theory of justice (1971), which sets out the 
provisions and procedures of a fair society. 
Rawls applies the notion of social contract to 
determine what social and political principles 
individuals would choose if they were in a si-
tuation which rules out pursuing one’s own in-
terests exclusively. Rawls constructs the con-
cept of the “original position,” where represen-
tatives of citizens are placed behind a “veil of 
ignorance,” thus being unaware of morally ire-
levant features of the parties they represent: 
“I assume that the parties are situated be-
hind a veil of ignorance. They do not know 
how the various alternatives will affect their 
particular case and they are obliged to eva-
luate principles solely on the basis of gene-
ral considerations. (…) First of all, no one 
knows his place in a society, his class po-
sition or social status, nor does he know his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, 
and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know 
his conception of good, the particulars of 
his rational plan of life, or even the social 
features of his psychology such as his aver-
sion to risk or liability to optimism or pes-
simism. More than this, I assume that the 
parties do not know the particular circums-
tances of their own society. This is, they do 
not know its economic or political situa-
tion, or the level of civilisation and culture 
it has been able to achieve. (…) It is taken 
for granted, however, that they know the 
general facts about human society. They 
understand political affairs and the princi-
ples of economic theory; they know the ba-
sics of social organisation and the laws of 
human psychology. Indeed, the parties are 
presumed to know whatever general facts 
affect the choice of the principles of jus-
tice” (Rawls 1971: 118-199). 
The knowledge in possession of the indivi-
duals is to guarantee that the principles chosen 
would be to everyone’s advantage and would 
promote one’s aims and interests whatever the-
se turn out to be. Rawls concludes that indivi-
duals would normally prefer more primary so-
cial goods, that is to say rights, liberties, op-
portunities, income and wealth and self-res-
pect25, rather than less (Rawls 1971: 123) and 
that they would agree on two principles of jus-
tice: 
The liberty principle, which assures that 
each person would have an equal right to 
the most extensive total system of equal ba-
sic liberties compatible with a similar sys-
tem of liberty for all. 
The difference principle, according to 
which social and economic inequalities (a) 
would be justified only if they were to the 
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) 
would be attached to positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity (Rawls 1971: 266). 
In line with these principles, a just system re-
quires an equal distribution of all primary so-
cial goods as well as an arrangement of trans-
fers and benefits that enhances the expecta-
tions of the least privileged (Rawls 1971: 267).  
Originally, Rawls applied his concept of justice 
to arrangements within a single society. In The 
Law of Peoples, his later work, Rawls trans-
ferred the concept to the international level 
and made representatives of “peoples,” and not 
individuals, parties to the contract. His inter-
national extension of justice, however, is limi-
ted to the duty to assist other peoples living 
under unfavourable conditions which prevent 
them from having a just or decent regime in 
their attempt to establish just domestic institu-
tions. It does not involve the difference princi-
ple and thus the transfer of wealth to less ad-
vantaged societies with a view to satisfying the 
principle of distributive justice. In Rawls’ view, 
such a principle would be unfounded since 
each society bears sole responsibility for its 
place in the global economic order and its 
wealth depends on the values and institutions 
it historically decided to adopt. In addition, he 
finds emotional ties between distant peoples 
on the globe not strong enough to give ground 
for a sense of international justice which 
would allow for global redistribution, thus ma-
ximizing the collective wealth of the least pri-
vileged (Hinsch 2001; Pogge 2001).  
                                                 
 
 
25 Rawls (1971: 54) explains that primary social goods are things 
that a rational man is presumed to want, whatever a person’s ra-
tional plan of life. 
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The domain of application of the difference 
principles was extended to the global realm by 
Rawls’ followers.26 This laid a foundation for 
the concept of global justice providing for in-
tersocietal distribution of income and wealth. 
Pogge (2001) holds that both the domestic and 
the international order, that is to say social and 
economic inequalities they feature, should be 
regulated by the same rules. This position jux-
taposes the egalitarian principle, assuming that 
all members of society have as equal citizens 
equal claims to share the fruits of social coope-
ration, with the global scope of intersocietal 
cooperation in today’s world. Hence, on con-
dition that societies have equal standing as 
participants in a system with an international 
division of labour and that intersocietal econo-
mic cooperation (flow of resources, goods and 
services) is sufficiently dense, producing both 
positive and negative externalities, societies 
should share the fruits and the burden of their 
joint cooperation efforts (Hinsch 2001). In line 
with this reasoning, distributive justice should 
not be an exclusively domestic area and should 
apply to the global community irrespective of 
national borders.27 If placed behind the “veil of 
ignorance,” not knowing their fate in the glo-
bal order, representatives of societies would 
agree on principles favourable to all and would 
allow for an unequal distribution of global 
wealth only if it was to the mutual advantage 
of all parties involved. 
 
2.2.3. Aid as a human rights-based duty  
Seen through the lenses of a rights-based ap-
proach to development, development aid is not 
an option but a duty of the international com-
munity and of each of its members. The duty 
is derived from international commitments 
embodied in international human rights law, 
particularly concerning economic, social and 
cultural rights and the right to development. 
The duty is based on the principle of univer-
                                                 
 
 
26 Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Brian Barry, among others 
(Hinsch 2001). 
27 Gosepath (2001) observes that the theory of global justice has 
to be conceived of in the context of globalization, particularly in 
terms of the nation-states’ loss of power to supranational actors 
such as international alliances and transnational corporations. 
The theory of global justice is running ahead of time because the 
process of globalization and the diminishment of power of na-
tion-states is still not widely recognized.  
sality of human rights, which implies that all 
have a responsibility for assuring that human 
rights are respected, protected, promoted and 
provided everywhere.  
Rights-based approach to development views 
the realisation of human rights both as the ul-
timate goal of development and as the way to 
achieve it. In line with this perspective, human 
rights and human development are mutually 
reinforcing. Development is seen as a process 
of realizing human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, enhancing human capabilities and 
expanding choices and opportunities so that 
people can live the lives that they value (Sen 
1999; UNDP 2000). Achievement of human 
rights, in turn, is vital for securing people’s 
well-being and guaranteeing a fair, non-discri-
minatory and enabling social environment. In 
other words, poverty means a denial of human 
rights and unfulfilled human rights impede 
overcoming poverty. 
Rights-based approach uses human rights as a 
common framework for development policy. It 
builds on the rights discourse encompassing 
both civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights, as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 and the two 1966 Covenants, on civil 
and political rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights respectively (see Box 4).28 The 
vision of development as a human right is 
reflected in the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, adopted by the General Assem-
bly in 1986 as a result of advocacy efforts by 
developing countries:  
“The right to development is an inalienable 
human right by virtue of which every hu-
man person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy eco-
                                                 
 
 
28 The body of international human rights law consists of inter-
national and regional instruments. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948 together with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 provide 
the cornerstone for human rights.  
The other milestone documents include: 1950 European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 1965 Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 1969 American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 1981 African Charter on Hu-
man and People’s Rights, 1984 Convention Against Torture, 
1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, 1989 Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, 1993 World Conference on Hu-
man Rights, Vienna, 1994 Convention on the Status of Refugees, 
1998 Treaty setting up the International Criminal Court.  
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nomic, social, cultural and political deve-
lopment, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully reali-
zed” (Article 1, paragraph 1). 
 
Box 4 
Human rights 
 
Right to life and liberty 
Equality and non-discrimination 
Political rights and freedoms  
Right to social security 
Right to work 
Right to health 
Right to food 
Right to housing 
Right to education 
 
A right claimed by one person implies a cor-
responding duty for someone else to take ac-
tion. However, mechanisms of fulfilment of 
human rights are a complex issue and there is 
no consensus on to what extent the interna-
tional community, including state and non-
state actors, is responsible for securing them. 
While the Declaration on the Right to Deve-
lopment assigns the responsibility for develop-
ment to all human beings, it identifies states as 
being primarily responsible for the realisation 
of this right. In principle, realisation of human 
rights relies, above all, on the implementation 
and application of international human rights 
law in the domestic legal system.29 Developing 
countries have particular difficulties in fulfil-
ling human rights, especially as regards econo-
mic, social and cultural rights, which, assu-
ming the goodwill of their leaders, is partly 
due to their limited institutional capacities and 
partly to their financial constraints. Yet, on ac-
count of the universal and indivisible character 
of human rights, meaning that they belong to 
all human beings simply because they are hu-
mans and that all rights are equally important, 
their implementation is a legitimate concern 
for all the members of the international com-
                                                 
 
 
29 As a declaration, and not a treaty, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is not a legally binding document subject to rati-
fication procedures. Yet, it includes elements of international 
customary law, that is norms that are legally biding to all states, 
irrespective of whether a state is a party of a treaty setting forth 
the norms.  
munity. While it is widely agreed that the in-
ternational community, and rich countries in 
particular, has a moral duty to support human 
rights, the financial dimension of this duty is a 
question of debate. The controversy concerns 
binding legal obligations for such measures, 
mainly with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights (ODI 1999). 
The Declaration on the Right to Development 
calls for individual and collective action by the 
states on the national and international level.30 
Both the Declaration and the International Co-
venant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights make explicit references to develop-
ment assistance as a means necessary for faci-
litating the full realisation of rights and ensu-
ring development: 
“Sustained action is required to promote 
more rapid development of developing 
countries. As a complement to the efforts of 
developing countries, effective international 
cooperation is essential in providing these 
countries with appropriate means and faci-
lities to foster their comprehensive develop-
ment” (Article 4, paragraph 2, Declaration 
on the Right to Development). 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and techni-
cal, to the maximum of its available resour-
ces, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realisation of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures ” (Article 2, para-
graph 1, International Covenant on Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant 
agree that international action for the achie-
vement of the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant includes such methods as 
(…) the furnishing of technical assistan-
ce…” (Article 23, International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)31. 
                                                 
 
 
30 Article 4, paragraph 1.  
31 Furthermore, as regards the right to an adequate standard of 
living, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights compel states to “take appropriate steps to ensure 
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essen-
tial importance of international co-operation based on free con-
sent” (Article 11, paragraph 1). 
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR 1990), in its comment 
on the nature of State parties obligations ari-
sing from the Covenant, identifies internatio-
nal cooperation for development and thus for 
the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights as an obligation of all states. The Com-
mittee emphasizes that without an active pro-
gramme of international assistance and coope-
ration on the part of the states which are in the 
position to assist others, the full realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights will re-
main an unfulfilled aspiration in many coun-
tries. Advocates of right-based approach, such 
as the United Nations Development Program, 
point to a special relevance of development aid 
for strengthening capacities of governments in 
developing countries so that they are able to 
comply with their obligations.32  
 
2.2.4. Aid in self-interest: a mechanism of 
provision of global public goods 
Finally, the rationale for aid can be drawn 
from its utility in addressing problems of con-
cern to all, irrespective of national borders. 
Aid can be destined to selectively finance areas 
neglected or underfunded by domestic efforts 
and thus contribute to the production of glo-
bal public goods and mitigation of effects of 
global public bads.  
Public goods33 are goods in the public domain. 
Unlike private goods, which are delineated by 
clear property rights attached to them in order 
to prevent other individuals from their con-
sumption, public goods are available to all and 
potentially affect everybody. In principle, pu-
blic goods are characterized by non-excludable 
benefits and non-rival consumption. Once a 
public good is provided, its benefits are availa-
ble to a large or unlimited number of consu-
mers at zero or negligible marginal cost, since 
excluding others from enjoying its benefits is 
difficult or impossible (e.g. streetlight). Non-
rivalry means that consumption of a public 
                                                 
 
 
32 UNDP (2000) points to three ways in which development coo-
peration can directly contribute to realizing human rights. First, 
by increasing support for capacity building for democracy and 
the promotion of civil and political rights. Second, by increasing 
support for poverty reduction. Third, by introducing an explicit 
right-based approach to aid programming.  
33 The term good in this context refers to goods, services and 
conditions.   
good by one person does not reduce the 
amount available to others (e.g. peace and se-
curity) (Reisen et al. 2004; Kaul and Mendoza 
2003).34  
A public good can be qualified as global if its 
benefits are quasi-universal in terms of coun-
tries (involving more than one group of coun-
tries), people (covering several or all popula-
tion groups), and generations (extending to 
both current and future generations, or at least 
meeting the basic needs of current generations 
without foreclosing development options for 
future generations) (Kaul et al. 1999).35 Global 
public bads (GPBs) share the features of global 
public goods but what is desirable is their pre-
vention rather than their production (e.g. at-
mospheric pollution, cross-border drug smug-
gling). 
 
Box 5 
Areas of Global Public Goods 
identified in Kaul et al. 1999 
 
Equity and justice 
Market efficiency: trade regimes and 
international financial stability 
Environment and cultural heritage  
Health  
Knowledge and information  
Peace and security 
 
 The public character of the goods in question 
also refers to their provision, which is condi-
tioned on contributions of many parties (e.g. 
law and order depend on the general level of 
respect for social norms and institutions). No-
netheless, seeing large externalities and the 
difficulties in excluding others from partaking 
                                                 
 
 
34 Goods which meet both criteria are considered to be pure pu-
blic goods. Yet fulfilling only one of the criteria is sufficient to 
make a good public. The range of partially public goods includes 
club goods (barriers to access can be imposed if exclusion costs 
are low, e.g. by charging fees), network goods (individual utility 
grows with the number of users, e.g. Internet), goods subject to 
congestion (e.g. roads), commons (e.g. fisheries) (Alonso 2002). 
35 On the basis of its geographical extension, a public good can 
be classified as international (if its benefits cross national bor-
ders of the producing country), regional (if it displays spill-over 
benefits to countries in the neighbourhood of the producing 
country, in a region which is smaller than the rest of the world), 
and global (if it benefits consumers all over the world, not ne-
cessarily to the same extent) (Reisen et al. 2004).  
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of the goods or in enforcing adequate compen-
sation, possible providers of public goods feel 
no natural incentives for their production. 
Therefore, public goods have to be provided 
through non-market mechanisms, traditionally 
attributed to government intervention.36  
Showing a natural disposition to being affected 
transnationally and intergenerationally, the en-
vironment is undoubtedly the primary area 
commonly associated with global public 
goods. However, the number of spheres of hu-
man activity with similar dispositions is gro-
wing (see Box 5). Kaul and Mendoza (2003) 
explain that some goods are naturally global 
(e.g. moonlight), but most global public goods 
are national public goods that have become 
global by policy choice (e.g. norms and stan-
dards) and as a result of globalisation (e.g. di-
sease control). With escalating cross-border 
and worldwide activity and mobility, repercus-
sions of underprovision of public goods and 
overproduction of public bads in one country 
have an increasingly global reach.  
“Failed states” (Afghanistan) are a safe heaven 
for illicit trade and terrorists and therefore un-
dermine international security. Largely defi-
cient public health systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are poorly equipped to contain AIDS 
epidemic, thus posing a threat to world health 
beyond the continent itself. International tra-
vel and trade brought about an increase in pre-
valence within industrial countries of diseases 
previously endemic to the South (Archibugi 
and Bizzarri 2004). Since the early 1970s, 20 
diseases have re-emerged or spread, often in 
more virulent or drug-resistant forms. The re-
cent appearance of the West Nile virus in the 
USA is a reminder that not all of these diseases 
are confined to the developing world (Kaul 
and Faust 2001). Corruption has many inter-
national implications: it impedes making cre-
dible commitments crucial for international 
agreements to function effectively, obstructs 
enforcement of anti-money laundering mea-
sures, and distorts optimal management of na-
tural resources, for instance rain forests (Eigen 
and Eigen-Zucchi 2003). A recession in a ma-
                                                 
 
 
36 Nevertheless, public goods not necessarily have to be provided 
through a direct state action. In effect, a spectrum of modified 
market mechanisms designed so as to ensure cooperation and 
equitable burden-sharing is quite extensive, including for exam-
ple by assigning property rights, quotas or setting taxes. 
jor economy distresses many others through 
trade and investment links. Financial crises 
can spread from one continent to another in a 
matter of hours, often not sparing economies 
with good fundamentals (Kaul and Mendoza 
2003). 
Provision of many public goods relies basically 
on national policies (supervision of banks, pol-
lution control, public health system) or on the 
national realisation of international commit-
ments (such as norms and standards, inclu-
ding human rights). Kaul et. al (2003b) make 
a point that from the production side, global 
public goods can be seen as globalized national 
public goods or as a sum of national public 
goods plus international cooperation. For ins-
tance, international financial stability entails 
that every country has to be preoccupied with 
its own financial system as well as with possi-
ble contagion from other countries. Similarly, 
national efforts to control and eradicate infec-
tious diseases, no matter how well financed, 
will be ineffective without collaboration on a 
wider scale.  
The largest part of global public good finan-
cing is national: it is estimated that national 
public spending on global public goods is 200 
times international spending. However, spen-
ding in industrial countries is five times spen-
ding in developing countries (Kaul et. al 
2003a). Undeniably, resources and capacities 
of developing countries are far from sufficient 
to supply their citizens with national public 
goods and thus to contribute to the adequate 
provision of global public goods. Nor are deve-
loping countries aptly equipped to participate 
in the process of definition of international 
measures and policies leading to creation of 
global public goods, such as multilateral trade 
regimes, let alone to ensure their implemen-
tation.  
 
Box 6 
Key development GPGs identified by 
DFID (Speight 2002) 
 
Knowledge generation and dissemination 
Communicable disease eradication 
The global commons 
A free and open trade system 
International financial stability 
Protection from crime and narcotics 
Global peace 
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Countries at dissimilar levels of development 
may have disparate preferences for assigning 
national and global public goods, but the fate 
of even the richest individuals rests on these 
preferences. Economic development prospects 
for Northern industries in Southern regions 
depend on development achievements in the 
South, which is largely undermined by defi-
cient public goods such as basic education, 
health or good governance (see Box 6). Over-
exploitation of fossil fuels, minerals and other 
non-renewable natural resources, in which 
many developing countries abound, endangers 
future supplies of crucial inputs for economies 
of industrial countries (e.g. coltan for mobile 
phones and other electronics). As the title of 
the report of the UK Commission for Africa 
(2005) suggests, because of our shared needs 
and linked destinies, development in Africa is 
in Our Common Interest. As a matter of fact, 
the report identifies self-interest as the first 
reason for bothering with Africa’s problems. 
In many cases, as regards biodiversity preser-
vation and climate stability for example, poor 
countries may be able to deliver inputs to glo-
bal public goods more cheaply than rich coun-
tries. If production of some goods is cheaper in 
poor countries, then it would be reasonable 
that these countries produce the goods in lar-
ger quantities than rich countries. However, in 
order to do so, poor countries would have to 
refrain from allocating part of their resources, 
anyway limited, for domestic ends. According-
ly, international income transfers are necessary 
to compensate developing countries for the ex-
tra costs they incur in producing global public 
goods that they would not supply if guided 
solely by national self-interest (Kaul et. al 
2003a).  
Naturally, aid is by no means the only answer 
to the underprovision of global public goods 
by poor countries. Yet often it appears to be 
more efficient that richer countries support 
poor countries in meeting their commitments 
than that they shoulder the costs of the resul-
ting overproduction of global public bads. In 
particular, aid was found to best contribute to 
public goods provision when these goods hin-
ge on the “weakest link”. For instance, eradi-
cation of diseases such as malaria or smallpox 
depends on the effort of the last countries to 
harbour these diseases (Kaul et al. 1999). In 
effect, according to calculations made by the 
OECD (Reisen et al. 2004), in the years 1997-
2001 spending on international public goods 
accounted for around 30 per cent of ODA: half 
on global and half on regional public goods.  
Nonetheless, it is also argued that treating fi-
nancing global public goods as aid expenditure 
largely distorts the idea of development assis-
tance, which should be focused on national 
development priorities of poor countries. Since 
donor countries participate in the consump-
tion of global public goods, they benefit from 
the spending they allegedly make in support of 
developing countries. Consequently, this line 
of argumentation recommends that funding 
for global public goods should come from 
non-aid accounts and should be included into 
the budgets of relevant sectoral ministries 
(Kaul et al. 1999; Kaul et al. 2003a). 
 
2.3. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER TWO 
The aforementioned rationales in support of 
aid to developing countries are not contradic-
tory. Quite the opposite, they can be perfectly 
used as complementary arguments in support 
of a greater aid effort to be made by societies 
in donor countries. However, not all of them 
may turn out to be equally convincing and 
able to sustain support for aid.  
The biggest weakness of the moral and ethical 
argument resides in its unilateral character. 
Moral duty is basically a duty of one party: it 
does not rely on mutual responsibilities and     
–irrespective of the rhetoric of equality– situa-
tes the recipient of aid in an inferior position.  
Effectively, in the current discourse on inter-
national development (both governmental and 
civil-society-led thinking) there is the evident 
shift of emphasis from charity to justice (Com-
mission for Africa 2005; McDonnell and Solig-
nac Lecompte 2002). Universality of human 
rights and justice, which are rooted in the 
principle of genuine equal standing of all peo-
ple, have a better appeal and a greater poten-
tial for attracting public support, including ac-
tive and self-organised engagement. In today’s 
more interconnected world, the cost of inac-
tion in the face of poverty goes beyond moral 
anguish of those who demonstrated indiffe-
rence.  
An effective argument in favour of aid must 
show how problems allegedly pertaining to de-
veloping countries are embedded in, and mat-
ter to, people’s daily lives. The concept of glo-
bal public goods serves as a useful perspective 
for illustrating how all benefit from a success-
ful addressing of problems whose implications 
recognize no borders. It offers a persuasive fra-
mework to explain when and why the ensuing 
burden should be disproportionately shared 
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between richer and poorer countries and why 
developing countries should be compensated 
for what they can uniquely contribute to the 
common global good. 
 
 
3. Policies and instruments 
for mobilizing public support 
for development assistance 
Chapter one concluded that support for de-
velopment aid in donor countries depends, 
among others, on people’s knowledge about 
international development policy realized by 
their governments and on general awareness 
and understanding of development issues. 
People –as individuals and collectives– who 
are better informed about official aid program-
mes demonstrate more favourable, even if cri-
tical, attitudes towards aid than people who 
are uninformed. Similarly, support for aid is 
higher among people who are more aware of 
and more interested in global development 
issues.  
Response to the needs and gaps in public awa-
reness in these areas rests, in principle, on two 
separate but closely related pillars: on informa-
tion and communication about development 
policy on the one hand, and on development 
education on the other. The first one pertains 
to the tissue of accountability mechanisms in 
democratic societies: it attends to citizens’ 
right to be informed about their government 
performance and about allocation of public 
money. It can be compared to, but should not 
be reduced to, Public Relations work. By focu-
sing on a particular development cooperation 
programme or a set of policies, it attempts to 
inform and explain aid to the public, along 
with persuading about its purposefulness. The 
second one is meant to facilitate understan-
ding of a complex international reality and as-
pires to change mindsets and behaviours. Basic 
differences between the two lie in their objec-
tive scope, temporal aspects and the potential 
to affect people’s attitudes. Whereas informa-
tion and communication about development 
policy intends to influence perceptions and 
raise awareness in the short term, development 
education seeks to arouse lasting value-based 
consciousness with the ultimate goal of pro-
ducing a sustained change in people’s beha-
viours. Needless to say, both approaches are 
mutually reinforcing: development awareness 
makes it easier to understand and approve of 
government development assistance policies, 
while familiarity with official aid programmes 
stimulates interest in international develop-
ment.  
Development cooperation programmes have 
generated an array of communication and edu-
cational approaches aiming at mobilizing pu-
blic support for development assistance in do-
nor countries. Referring to “the state of the 
art” can be especially useful for new donors,37 
for whom the exercise of communicating in-
creasing aid efforts to the public is particularly 
challenging. This final chapter intends to pre-
sent what measures can be taken by official aid 
agencies and relevant authorities so as to im-
prove public understanding of international 
development and development policies and 
eventually secure public support for them. It 
gives an overview of concepts, policies and 
instruments applied by donors with considera-
ble and valuable experience in development 
cooperation and with inspiring achievements 
in the field of awareness raising and develop-
ment education. 
 
3.1. DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION AND 
GLOBAL EDUCATION 
While terms such as “information and commu-
nication” are generally understood, this is not 
necessarily the case with “development educa-
tion”. The rudiments of the concept can be 
found in 1974 UNESCO’s General Conference 
Recommendation concerning Education for 
International Understanding, Co-operation 
and Peace and Education relating to Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The docu-
ment underlines that education “implies the 
entire process of social life by means of which 
individuals and social groups learn to develop 
consciously within, and for the benefit of, the 
national and international communities” and 
that it should promote understanding, toleran-
ce and friendship among all nations, racial or 
                                                 
 
 
37 New donors within the UE are not absolute novices to deve-
lopment cooperation. However, seeing that their involvement 
prior to the transition from communism to democracy and mar-
ket economy was guided by principles differing from modern 
day approaches to poverty reduction, which are based on part-
nership with developing countries and their ownership of deve-
lopment policies, and that it was supported by much biased rhe-
toric rather than by genuine public understanding of develop-
ment problems, new donors actually cannot draw from much of 
their earlier experience.  
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religious groups, including awareness of the 
increasing global interdependence between 
peoples and nations, and foster international 
solidarity and cooperation. The advancement 
of the concept of development education bene-
fited from richness of approaches and perspec-
tives contributed by NGDOs, e.g. Oxfam or Sa-
ve the Children, and international organisa-
tions, such as UNICEF, as well as from the 
philosophy of sustainable development.  
According to the Development Education As-
sociation (DEA), a UK umbrella association of 
organisations promoting global perspectives in 
education, development education “aims to 
raise awareness and understanding of how glo-
bal issues affect the lives of individuals, com-
munities and societies and how all of us can 
and do influence the global society we live in  
–as active global citizens. It aims to bring glo-
bal perspectives into all aspects of learning– 
the schools, universities, local community ini-
tiatives, the media.” More specifically, deve-
lopment education is explained as “lifelong 
learning that: 
? explores the links between people living 
in the “developed” countries of the North 
with those of the “developing” South, ena-
bling people to understand the links bet-
ween their own lives and those of people 
throughout the world 
? increases understanding of the economic, 
social, political and environmental forces 
which shape our lives 
? develops the skills, attitudes and values 
which enable people to work together to 
take action to bring about change and ta-
ke control of their own lives 
? works towards achieving a more just and 
a more sustainable world in which power 
and resources are more equitably shared.” 
The North-South Centre of the Council of Eu-
rope applies the term “global education,” defi-
ning it as “education that opens people’s eyes 
and minds to the realities of the world, and 
awakens them to bring about a world of grea-
ter justice, equity and human rights for all”. 
This umbrella term is understood to encom-
pass:  
? Development Education,  
? Human Rights Education,  
? Education for Sustainability,  
? Education for Peace and Conflict Preven-
tion and  
? Intercultural Education,   
which are the global dimensions of Education 
for Citizenship.  
Irrespective of the adjectives attached, these 
approaches to education share a common pool 
of essential features: value base, active and par-
ticipatory learning, and pursuit of social chan-
ge on local and global levels. They offer a ran-
ge of views from different social and cultural 
groups around the world. They are founded on 
a justice perspective and a sense of individual 
and collective, as well as intergenerational, 
multi-aspect responsibility (social, economic, 
cultural, political, security) over the world. 
They inspire to explore connections and inter-
actions between societies, cultures and envi-
ronments and to provoke reflection and analy-
sis of the roles that people can play within 
their own local contexts to build a fairer 
world. Last but not least, they involve life-long 
learning and are realized in both formal and 
non-formal learning environments.  
 
3.2. LEVEL OF FUNDING FOR 
COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
EDUCATION 
As is has been pointed out in chapter one, pu-
blic support for aid is related to the level of go-
vernment expenditure on information about 
development policy and development educa-
tion.38 Understandably, higher level of inputs 
into information and development education 
should make it possible to reach a wider au-
dience and develop good-quality programmes. 
This should result in better public awareness 
and deeper understanding of global processes 
and eventually lead to a higher support for de-
velopment cooperation policies and internatio-
nal solidarity. A more critically informed pu-
blic opinion should also be more committed 
and active in the private sphere.   
As illustrated in Table 1, the level of spending 
on information, PR and development educa-
tion can be benchmarked relative to total ODA 
or as expenditure per capita. Evidently, the 
                                                 
 
 
38 This does not preclude that the level of support may also de-
pend on the volume of spending by non-state actors.  
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group of leading awareness raising spenders in 
absolute numbers –the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Belgium– corresponds 
with the group of the leading ODA spenders in 
terms of the share of the national income (see 
Table 2 in Annex 2). In relation to total ODA, 
donor spending on information and develop-
ment education, with the exception of Bel-
gium, does not exceed 1%. 
 
Table 1 
Expenditures on information, Public Relations and development education* 
1.00
0.62
0.56
0.90
1.85
0.92
0.47
0.74
0.57
0.30
0.61
0.21
0.17
0.27
0.16
0.07
0.04
0.07
0.01
1.95
1.85
1.67
1.66
1.56
0.68
0.58
0.37
0.32
0.23
0.18
0.16
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.003
0.04
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Belgium
Ireland
Switzerland
Canada
Austria
Finland
Spain
United Kingdom
Australia
Italy
New Zealand
Japan
France
Germany
United States
per cent of total ODA expenditure per capita in US$
 
*As of 2002 for Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, UK, US; 2001 for Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark; 2000 for 
Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland; and 1998 for France. 
 
SOURCE: McDonnell et al. 2003. 
 
 
Awareness raising activities are generally as-
sessed to be underfunded by donor countries. 
None of the donors meets the target of 3% of 
ODA recommended by the United Nations De-
velopment Program as required for develop-
ment education (NSC 2003). More radical pro-
posals called for 100% and 25% of ODA being 
dedicated to development education in richer 
countries.39 Their authors argued that only a 
heavy investment in public awareness can as-
sure a broad and critical public support for 
global poverty reduction and cohesion, which 
in consequence would produce a real change 
in the commitment of these countries to attain 
global justice (NSC 2003; McDonnell et al. 
                                                 
 
 
39 The proposal of 100% is attributed to Julius Nyrere, the former 
president of Tanzania (McDonnell et al. 2003). 25% was sugges-
ted by Michael Edwards (2002). 
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2003). Securing funding for development edu-
cation seems to be especially relevant in the 
context of the ongoing increase of aid budgets. 
Without stable and predictable funding, it will 
not be possible to assure good-quality pro-
grammes and long-term planning of develop-
ment education activities.  
Voices from the development education lobby 
suggest that tying development education fun-
ding to percentages of ODA may be initially 
useful, but may prove problematic if ODA 
falls. Setting a per capita target is another op-
tion. Alternatively, development education 
could be fully integrated into formal education 
systems and funded from the budgets of re-
levant ministries (NSC 2003; McDonnell et al. 
2003).  
 
3.3. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
Another indication of dedication to communi-
cating with the public and development educa-
tion can be found in the legislative and policy 
bases adopted by donor countries. In Austria 
and Belgium, for instance, these areas are ex-
plicitly legislated. According to the Austrian 
Law on Development Cooperation,40 informing 
the Austrian public, through cultural and edu-
cational activities as well as Public Relations, 
are part of official Austrian development coo-
peration (NSC 2003). Communication, raising 
public awareness about development coopera-
tion and development education are explicitly 
recognized as clear priorities of the Belgian law 
on international cooperation (McDonnell et al. 
2003).41 
In the Netherlands, every four years a policy 
paper on development education and aware-
ness raising is elaborated by the National 
Committee for International Cooperation and 
Sustainable Development (NCDO), an autono-
mous body which promotes and supports glo-
bal education on behalf of the Dutch govern-
ment. After a consultation process involving 
public debate, the paper is submitted to the 
parliament and endorsed as a framework pro-
                                                 
 
 
40 The law was adopted in 1974 and reformed in 2002 (NSC 
2003). 
41 Adopted in May 1999 (McDonnell et al. 2003). 
gramme (Höck 1996).42 Commitment of the 
British government to enhancing the impact 
and effectiveness of development awareness is 
expressly declared in DFID's White Paper “Eli-
minating World Poverty” (DFID 1997) and 
sustained in the strategy paper “Building Sup-
port for Development” (DFID 1999).43 The 
strategy paper acknowledges the previous ne-
glect in government funding of development 
education in the UK,44 stresses the relevance of 
development education in changing peoples' 
behaviours and attitudes and puts special em-
phasis on the role of individuals' informed 
choices.45 The Irish Development Education 
Strategy Plan 2003-2005 (Ireland Aid 2003) is 
founded on a rights-based approach to access 
to development education.46 It emphasizes that 
development education contributes to global 
poverty reduction, among others, by enabling 
people to challenge policies that perpetuate 
poverty and to change unsustainable lifestyles. 
The paper clearly distinguishes between deve-
lopment education and raising awareness of 
the official aid programme. It underlines that 
improved public understanding of develop-
ment issues and a better comprehension of the 
development cooperation programme should 
lead not only to increased support but also to a 
greater sense of ownership of the programme 
among the public. 
 
3.4. INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES 
It is argued that since government information 
and communication on development coopera-
tion policy and development education are ba-
                                                 
 
 
42 The paper includes guidelines for Dutch NGOs working in the 
field (Höck 1996). 
43 The strategy paper affirms the government's dedication to pro-
mote understanding of global interdependences, of major chal-
lenges and prospects for international development (especially 
the poverty reduction agenda) as well as of hitherto achieve-
ments and further potential in this regard (DFID 1999). 
44 Until 1997 there was virtually no official funding for develop-
ment education in the UK and all the efforts in this field were 
NGO-driven initiatives. 
45 The strategy paper recognizes that informed public opinion 
helps ensure that the UK plays its full role in generating the in-
ternational political will necessary to meet the international po-
verty eradication targets (DFID 1999).  
46 Its mission statement says as follows: “Everyone in Ireland will 
have access to educational opportunities to be aware of and un-
derstand their rights and responsibilities as global citizens and 
their potential to effect change for a more just and equal world” 
(Ireland Aid 2003). 
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sed on different approaches and should not be 
mistaken, these two areas should be governed 
by separate structures.47 The separation is 
believed to ensure professionalisation of the 
information work along with a greater open-
ness to and a wider representation of institu-
tions –from both the governmental and non-
governmental realm– involved in development 
education (Smillie and Helmich 1998; Höck 
1996). Actual institutional arrangements in 
donor countries vary not only by the degree of 
such separation but also by the degree of cen-
tralisation and by the nature of involvement of 
civil society organisations in the definition and 
implementation of development education po-
licies.  
In the Netherlands, there is a clear distinction 
between execution of and funding for informa-
tion work regarding development cooperation 
and development education. Information work 
is carried out by the Information and Commu-
nication Department of the MFA, which is res-
ponsible for communication concerning all fo-
reign policy areas, development cooperation 
included.48 Development education and aware-
ness raising are entrusted to the National 
Committee for International Cooperation and 
Sustainable Development (NCDO),49 which 
operates as an autonomous administrative 
authority under the MFA and is fully govern-
ment-funded (NSC 2005).50 The general aim of 
the NCDO is to strengthen support for inter-
national cooperation and sustainable develop-
ment and for the achievement of the MDGs 
among the Dutch public. Its programmes are 
designed in cooperation with various minis-
                                                 
 
 
47 The question of institutional arrangements to address develop-
ment education is further complicated by the fact that it resides 
at the intersection of development policy and education policy. 
Therefore, its adequate conceptualization, quality assurance, fi-
nancing and realization requires an intensive collaboration of at 
least two ministries. 
48 The Dutch MFA has a two-fold structure. It is composed of fi-
ve policy-making directorates and several departments which 
are engaged in either policy-related or support activities. Deve-
lopment cooperation is handled by the Directorate General for 
International Cooperation. www.minbuza.nl 
49 The NCDO is the oldest development education support struc-
ture in Europe. Its predecessor, the National Committee for De-
velopment Education (NCO), was established by the Dutch go-
vernment in 1971 and in 1996 merged with the Council on En-
vironmental Education to become the National Committee for 
International Co-operation and Sustainable Development. 
50 At certain stages several ministries provided funding to and 
through the NCDO, while the MFA has always been its key 
funder and in 2005 it provided the full budget (NSC 2005). 
tries and then implemented mainly, but not 
exclusively, by ways of funding activities of 
other organisations and institutions. Along 
with the funding and coordination roles, the 
NCDO launches its own initiatives, engages in 
capacity building and facilitates public and 
political debate on development cooperation 
policy and its coherence.51 Respected as a 
“Centre of Excellence” in the field of global 
education, NCDO is the largest and most well-
resourced funding structure in this field in 
Europe and has served as a model for other 
countries developing such structures (NSC 
2003). 
In Austria, information on development issues 
and development education up to 2005 were 
realized by the Department for Development 
Cooperation of the MFA and KommEnt (So-
ciety for Communication and Development), a 
specialized service agency modelled on the 
Dutch NCDO. The Department for Develop-
ment Cooperation focused primarily on “ma-
cro-communication” directed to decision ma-
kers, public administrations, business sector 
and larger audiences within the Austrian pu-
blic. “Micro-level communication,” including 
awareness-raising and information work with 
more specific partner and target-groups, was 
outsourced to KommEnt on the basis of three-
year competitively tendered contracts with the 
MFA and the Ministry for Education, Science 
and Culture. KommEnt provided support to 
NGOs in the field of information, development 
education and culture by means of funding 
and coordination of projects, improvement of 
programmes, capacity building and training, 
and networking. In addition, it conducted qua-
lity assessment and research activities and con-
tributed to policy formulation.52 Following the 
setting up in 2004 of the Austrian Develop-
ment Agency (ADA) –to serve as an operatio-
                                                 
 
 
51 The NCDO’s highest decision-making structure, the National 
Committee, relies on representation of diverse civil society orga-
nisations, including churches, trade unions, NGDOs, private 
sector, migrant organisations and local and regional authorities. 
52 Decisions on funding were consulted with KommEnt’s four 
specialist advisory bodies (education, culture/film, science/pu-
blication, public relations/media), which included representati-
ves from civil society organisations. The advisory bodies also de-
cided on the guidelines for development education and awa-
reness building on global issues. Definition of KommEnt's long-
term objectives lied in the Council, which was composed of re-
presentatives from the political, academic, education and deve-
lopment cooperation sector, media, churches, trade unions, em-
ployer's federation, international organisations, and NGDOs. 
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nal unit administering and implementing the 
bilateral cooperation programme– the main 
tasks of KommEnt have been integrated into 
the Agency (NSC 2003; NSC 2006).  
In Ireland, the responsibility for both public 
awareness of the development cooperation 
programme and development education lies in 
a dedicated unit in the Development Coope-
ration Directorate (Irish Aid), a division within 
the Irish MFA which administers the aid pro-
gramme and conducts development policy. 
The Communications, Information and Deve-
lopment Education Section, as the unit is cal-
led, was established in 2002 to take over the 
work of the former National Committee for 
Development Education (NCDE), an agency 
under the MFA.53 Along with developing and 
implementing information and communica-
tion strategy for the Irish development coope-
ration programme, the section is responsible 
for the realisation of a strategic plan for deve-
lopment education (mentioned in point 0). It 
is supported by the Development Education 
Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs to offer policy advice on 
development education, to oversee reviews 
and evaluation of development education acti-
vities and to manage an annual consultation 
forum on development education (Ireland Aid 
2003).54  
In Norway, information activities on bilateral 
aid are carried out by the Information Depart-
ment of the Norwegian Agency for Develop-
ment Cooperation (Norad), a directorate un-
der the MFA. The broader North-South issues 
are addressed by NGOs under two separate 
framework agreement arrangements: with 1) 
the RORG-Network, an NGO-network dedica-
                                                 
 
 
53 The NCDE had independent decision-making functions and 
apparatus, relying on representation of the ministries in charge 
of foreign affairs and education as well as on civil society in-
volvement, including trade unions, youth and women's orga-
nisations. In its original terms of reference, the NCDE's role in-
cluded policy formulation, research, consultation, evaluation 
and advocacy. In practice, however, it was perceived predomi-
nantly as a funding agency and its policy-making functions were 
assessed as unsatisfactory (Ireland Aid 2003; NSC 2003).  
54 This body, entrusted with appraisal of grant applications, in-
cludes representatives of the ministry of education, the National 
Council for Curriculum and Assessment, and an independent 
consultant. National Council for Curriculum and Assessment is 
an advisory body to the Minister for Education (Ireland Aid 
2003).  
ted to development education55 and with 2) so-
called “big five” Norwegian NGDOs (Norwe-
gian Church Aid, Norwegian Peoples Aid, 
Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee 
Council and Save the Children - Norway) that 
have been receiving Norad funding for deve-
lopment education since 1997. The framework 
agreements with the “big five” are based on a 
four-year strategy plan and require that a spe-
cific part of funding is used for projects and 
activities that these organisations carry out to-
gether (NSC 2003).  
In the UK, DFID's Information and Civil So-
ciety Department56 carries out information and 
communication work as well as promotion of 
development awareness and education. It ad-
ministers a number of development education 
grant schemes, including the main one: Deve-
lopment Awareness Fund. The responsibility 
for small grants financed from this fund is 
devolved to the Development Education Asso-
ciation, a national representative NGO-civil 
society development education umbrella body, 
and its sister networks in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (NSC 2003).57 In principle, 
DFID works through strategic partnerships in 
different priority sectors and regions. In 2002, 
it started supporting new forms of partnership 
(Strategic Grant Agreements) addressed to 
broader sectors of civil society not primarily 
focused on international development (such as 
trade unions, professional associations, local 
government, faith groups, black and minority 
ethnic groups). The scheme has a substantial 
development education component.58  
 
3.5. TARGET GROUPS 
Government explicit and implicit strategies in 
both areas (i.e. information and communica-
                                                 
 
 
55 Initially (1991-1992), the RORG-Network functioned as an 
informal and loose network and was officially established in 
1999. Until 2003, it was funded by Norad on the basis of annual 
applications from the NGOs. The new four-year arrangement is 
meant to stimulate innovative projects and broader cooperation 
among NGOs on development education. 
56 The Information and Civil Society Department makes a part of 
DFID's Information, Knowledge and Communications Division. 
57 CADA in Northern Ireland; IDEAS in Scotland; Cyfanfwyd in 
Wales (NSC 2003). 
58 As of 2006, DFID has signed seven agreements, providing on 
average funding of £335,000 per organisation over an initial 
period of three years (but long-term commitment is intended). 
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tion work and development education/aware-
ness raising) rely on targeting principally 
groups or segments of society that are either 
already interested in development issues and 
supportive of development cooperation –thus 
being “fertile ground” for awareness raising 
work– or sectors that are unfamiliar with deve-
lopment topics. For example, Information De-
partment of Belgian DGIC targets segments of 
society that are already favourable to develop-
ment cooperation (McDonnell et al. 2003). 
DFID decided to concentrate its initial work 
around four main complementary target 
groups with a high potential: formal education 
sector, media, business and trade unions, and 
faith communities (DFID 1999).  
The groups can be identified through public 
opinion polling and analysis of declared level 
of interest, engagement and support for deve-
lopment cooperation. Subsequent examination 
of the declared sources of information on de-
velopment issues can lead to identification of 
target groups with the biggest multiplying po-
tential.  
Irrespective of their development awareness le-
vel, children and youth are believed to be a 
“natural public” for development education 
activities. It is during adolescence when iden-
tity starts to be formed and when values con-
cerning democracy and social relations are for-
ged (NetAid 2004).59 Journalists, teachers and 
decision-makers are most commonly conside-
red to be the “multiplying agents” best positio-
ned and prepared to influence public opinion. 
Institutional information multipliers include 
faith-based organisations and NGOs, traditio-
nally active in and concerned with develop-
ment issues, in addition to universities and re-
search institutions.  
More recently, trade unions, business sector 
and diaspora communities have been identi-
fied as key audiences and partners. Relevance 
of trade unions is growing especially in the 
context of the current debate on trade libera-
lisation and delocalisation of manufacturing 
and services to developing and transition 
countries. In some Northern countries trade 
                                                 
 
 
59 Not only is youth more receptive to development education 
activities but is it also relatively easy to reach through a formal 
education system. Youth is identified as one of the key audien-
ces of global education activities promoted by the North South 
Centre of the Council of Europe.  
unions realize courses on the impact of glo-
balisation on their members, discussing pro-
blems of supply chains and core labour stan-
dards (DFID 1999; European Conference 
2005). DFID (1999) identifies business sector 
as “both a target and a potential key partner in 
building greater awareness and understanding 
of development issues”. It underlines its cru-
cial role in influencing public attitudes, espe-
cially regarding social responsibility in the 
workplace and the community. In the Nether-
lands, the NCDO launched a special program-
me intended to stimulate greater interest in 
development in developing countries by the 
Dutch business community and to encourage 
active and sustainable investment (NSC 2005). 
Working with diaspora communities is seen as 
an appropriate way of assuring voices from the 
South, especially as regards debate on cultural 
diversity and intercultural understanding (Eu-
ropean Conference 2005).  
 
3.6. PROGRAMMES, ACTIVITIES AND 
POLICY MEASURES 
Donor governments and development educa-
tors build on a range of instruments and ap-
proaches to communicate development policy 
and raise development awareness among both 
general and targeted audiences. Obviously, the 
overview presented here is by no means ex-
haustive. It is rather meant to highlight most 
interesting and promising ideas from the point 
of view of the needs of new donors. 
 
3.6.1. Formal education 
Development educators agree that develop-
ment and global education should be integra-
ted into school curricula and mainstreamed in 
the programmes of higher education institu-
tions. Global education should not be treated 
as a privilege but rather as a right to which 
everybody is entitled and as a public good 
from which everybody benefits (NSC 2004). 
Feasibility of integration of global develop-
ment education into formal education systems 
depends on the degree of their centralisation 
and on schools’ and school districts’ curricular 
autonomy. In Finland, for instance, develop-
ment education was part of school curricula 
since the early 1970s. Since 1994, however, 
schools have more freedom in curriculum and 
the government, as well as NGOs, promote de-
velopment education among teachers by pro-
viding teaching materials, supporting teachers 
tours and study groups. Global education is 
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compulsory in Belgian schools: each school 
has to have a visible global education activity 
every year. In order to assess and adequately 
address the actual needs of the formal edu-
cation sector in the UK, DFID conducted an 
audit of material, human and organisational 
resources. Its results are believed to have im-
proved guidance for teachers on international 
development issues. 
  
3.6.2. Information and communication on 
development policy 
Donors developed communication tools which 
go beyond ensuring visibility of development 
cooperation programmes and complying with 
the legal obligation of reporting to the public 
on the execution of the international develop-
ment policy (in the form of press releases, an-
nual reports, and summaries of evaluations). 
In fact, donor agencies adopted many mea-
sures traditionally applied by NGOs, such as 
own media (magazines, newsletters, internet 
portals), thematic campaigns and educational 
materials.  
Internationale Samenwerking [International 
Cooperation], a free monthly magazine for the 
general public published by the Dutch govern-
ment, has one hundred thousand subscribers. 
Sam Sam [Together] is read by half a million 
Dutch senior primary schoolchildren and there 
is another magazine for secondary school level 
youth (McDonnell et al. 2003). Each issue of 
Kehitys-Utveckling [Development], Finnish 
quarterly magazine, is devoted to a different 
development theme. The Austrian government 
produces thematic publications on bilateral aid 
priority countries.  
So as to foster interest in its activities, Sida 
practices an open door policy. It has moved its 
headquarters to a more central location in 
Stockholm so that the passing public be temp-
ted to use Sida public education services. It has 
developed an open culture where the staff can-
teen and the library are open to the public and 
a café on the ground floor became a popular 
bar in the evening (McDonnell et al. 2003).  
 
3.6.3. Stimulating public debate 
Government efforts to increase public aware-
ness and ownership of development coopera-
tion policy may also involve inciting and pro-
moting public debate on directions and alloca-
tions of aid.  
Political culture in Sweden provides for car-
rying out policy debates in an open manner, 
allowing for active involvement of various 
stakeholders and the general public. In 1999, 
the Parliament appointed the Commission of 
Inquiry into Swedish Policy for Global Deve-
lopment to investigate how to formulate cohe-
rent policies to combat poverty under the new 
conditions created by globalisation. Its manda-
te was to determine how Swedish policy for 
sustainable development should be furthered 
at a time of ever-increasing global interdepen-
dence. Consisting of representatives of all po-
litical parties, NGOs, trade unions, business 
associations, different ministries and Sida, as 
well as academic consultants, the Commission 
worked in an open way, with a long list of pu-
blic seminars, hearings and partner meetings. 
It travelled to towns and cities to discuss the 
issues with interested citizens (McDonnell et 
al. 2003).  
In line with its declared commitment to open-
ness and dialogue about its policies (DFID 
1997), in 1998 DFID launched a Development 
Policy Forum process, a nationwide series of 
meetings during which participants from va-
rious civil society sectors (NGOs, trade 
unions, ethnic minority groups, businesses, lo-
cal government, community and faith groups) 
were invited to spend a day discussing current 
development issues with a government panel 
travelling to different cities in the UK. The 
process was intended to raise awareness and 
deepen understanding of current issues and to 
“share thinking and ideas” on development, 
involving “individuals and representatives 
drawn from across society” (DFID 2002). Each 
of the three rounds of the Forum (1998, 2000 
and 2002) focused on a different set of issues, 
ranging from humanitarian aid and conflict, 
corruption, aid effectiveness, aid untying, tra-
de and development and the role of the private 
sector.60 In addition, the Secretary of State ma-
kes regional visits around the UK with the aim 
of building support for development and rai-
sing awareness of DFID's work. The visits 
usually involve a public forum for an invited 
                                                 
 
 
60 1998 round: partnerships, improved aid effectiveness, huma-
nitarian aid and conflict reduction. 2000 round: trade, corrup-
tion and aid untying. 2002 round: potential of globalization to 
reduce world poverty, in particular, the relationship between en-
vironment and development, trade, the role of the private sector 
in international development (DFID 2002; ODI 2003). 
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audience, with presentations and questions 
sessions. They are considered to be a good op-
portunity for development issues to be covered 
in the local media (ODI 2003).  
Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) fostered public debate on the nature 
and the role of Canadian development assis-
tance through publication in June 2001 of a 
discussion paper entitled “Strengthening Aid 
Effectiveness, New Approaches to Canadian 
International Assistance Programme.” The 
consultation process on the issues raised in the 
paper –in particular, geographical and sectoral 
concentration, policy coherence, tied aid, fun-
ding for NGOs, role of private sector and ac-
countability– involved direct meetings with in-
dividuals and civil society organisations. It also 
included submitting opinions and comments 
by Canadians and people overseas through an 
interactive website. (McDonnell et al. 2003; 
CIDA website).61  
 
3.6.4. The media 
Public development awareness is largely in-
fluenced and shaped by the media, chiefly tele-
vision, which is the major source of informa-
tion on developing countries and world issues. 
Dissemination of information through mass 
media has a greater coverage potential than 
using the aforementioned own channels craf-
ted in donor information departments. As sig-
nalled by DFID, the first step to work with the 
media on awareness raising is to analyze the 
content of the coverage they give to develo-
ping countries, to investigate into media policy 
makers’ approach to this coverage and to test 
audience attitudes. The study conducted by 
DFID in 2000 with major television companies 
concluded that one of the reasons for the un-
balanced coverage of developing countries  
(disasters, bizarre events, travel and wildlife) 
was reluctance of media policy makers’ to in-
vest in programming which could bring lower 
audience ratings. Many donor governments, 
e.g. Danish, British or Finnish, attempt to clo-
se this incentive gap and to promote better 
quality programmes by providing travel grants 
to journalists for field trips to developing 
                                                 
 
 
61 The discussion paper and the debate served as a basis for 
CIDA's new policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness 
“Canada making a difference in the world”, published in 2002. 
countries in order to encourage production of 
documentaries.62 Finland adopted an even mo-
re long-term approach: it supports a number of 
journalist training courses to nurture interest 
and understanding of developing issues among 
future journalists.  
 
3.6.5. Promoting direct involvement and 
direct exposure 
Providing opportunities for personal engage-
ment in development issues and direct exposu-
re to development alternatives is perhaps the 
most powerful way to enhance awareness of 
seemingly distant concerns and invisible mu-
tual connections.  
Dutch Kleine Plaatselike Activiteiten [Small 
Local Activities] programme is assessed as par-
ticularly successful in promoting direct invol-
vement of the Dutch in development. The pro-
gram supports groups that raise funds for a 
specific assistance project overseas, which is 
then used as a basis for stimulating interest, 
understanding and commitment among the 
wider public. Under certain criteria, half of the 
cost is matched by the NCDO, which also co-
vers promotion and education work. The 
groups involved in projects are often from ser-
vice organisations (e.g. Rotary) rather than 
from groups already associated with develop-
ment, such as NGOs. This is believed to broa-
den public engagement and foster grassroots 
involvement (McDonnell et al. 2003; NSC 
2005). 
The merit of volunteer service and exchange 
programmes, long-established in development 
cooperation,63 though sometimes notorious for 
their supply-driven character, lies in their 
perspective-changing potential. Norway chan-
ged the formula of its former Volunteer Service 
(Fredskorpset) by launching an innovative 
programme whereby participants are recruited 
from companies, institutions and NGOs in 
Norway and developing countries to work in a 
corresponding and co-operating business 
                                                 
 
 
62 For example, DFID’s Travel Bursary and Documentary Re-
search Fund offers grants to television journalists to assist them 
in creating programs on developing country issues. 
63 For example, Norwegian Volunteer Service and the US Peace 
Corps were established at the beginning of the 1960s.  
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abroad for one to three years.64 Exchange of 
volunteers goes three ways: Norwegians go to 
developing countries; young adults from the 
South come to Norway or may go to another 
country in the South (Fredskorpset 2003). 
Twinning of communities is yet another way 
to foster links between local governments, 
schools, industries, as well as cultural and 
sports organisations. 
 
3.7. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER THREE  
Potential lessons to be drawn from the fore-
going brief overview should not so much con-
cern concrete solutions –which are always de-
pendent on the particularities of political and 
administrative systems– but rather general 
considerations to be taken into account by do-
nors intending to elaborate strategies for buil-
ding a constituency for development aid. The-
re are ample opportunities to exploit synergies 
between an improved awareness of a develop-
ment cooperation programme and a better pu-
blic understanding of development issues. 
Creating a solid legislative or policy founda-
tion for raising development awareness should 
be helpful in signalling political commitment 
in this area and in setting a reference frame-
work which would advise on novel concepts. 
Policy-makers should not be afraid of a greater 
transparency in development cooperation po-
licy and of initiating public debate in this re-
gard, since such measures can help create a 
sense of ownership of the aid programmes and 
form a more critical and aid-supportive public. 
Information on development cooperation poli-
cy and development education are not equiva-
lent and require different approaches, inclu-
ding dedicated support structures. A range of 
non-state actors can offer an invaluable con-
tribution to both policy-making on and imple-
mentation of development education. Their in-
volvement should be systemically incorporated 
into official programmes through setting up of 
adequate institutional arrangements, such as 
advisory bodies or grant allocating and evalua-
ting committees. Effective development educa-
tion programmes require intra-governmental 
cooperation to allow for integrating develop-
                                                 
 
 
64 Under the previous formula participants were recruited from 
among agronomists, health workers and teachers. 
ment awareness needs into curricula realized 
in the formal education system. Moreover, 
awareness raising both through formal and 
non-formal education has to be given high 
budgetary priority – it demands securing ap-
propriate public funding. Resources for deve-
lopment education and awareness raising 
should be earmarked in the budget of the Mi-
nistry of Education or linked to ODA spen-
ding. When designing awareness raising pro-
grammes, it should be remembered that real 
awareness involves changing perspectives and 
behaviours, but information and facts alone 
are not sufficient to change them. Therefore, 
high impact measures have to combine lear-
ning with active engagement. 
 
4. Final conclusions 
The current discourse on donors’ efforts to 
provide more assistance to developing coun-
tries –which would allow for the realization of 
the Millennium Development Goals– assumes 
that public support for a sustained increase in 
aid budgets is essential.  
The preceding reflection on public attitudes 
towards aid in donor societies leads to the con-
clusion that even though public attitudes may 
not translate directly into the levels of deve-
lopment assistance spending, they are an im-
portant factor which conditions effectiveness 
of international development policies. The fee-
lings of public opinion give a basis for an ove-
rall political context within which the debate 
on cooperation and aid policies is developed. 
Studies into public attitudes towards develop-
ment assistance affirm that the most valuable 
support base for aid is a critical one – one ma-
king informed personal choices, capable of 
voicing effectively its concerns and of exerting 
political pressure.  
As inferred from the foregoing review of fac-
tors potentially influencing public support for 
aid, awareness of official development coope-
ration programmes and understanding of glo-
bal development problems in general are more 
decisive for public attitudes towards aid than 
such economic factors as the well-being of the 
donor country or the scale of its involvement 
in foreign trade. These factors turn out to be 
equally important to support for development 
assistance as domestic egalitarian social arran-
gements.  
Public opinion polls reveal that humanitarian 
concerns are the leading motives for providing 
 36
assistance to poorer countries. People in the 
North are most preoccupied with problems 
such as famine, health and environment, that 
is those which can be easily seen from one’s 
own personal perspective. Though ethical and 
moral considerations and charity approaches 
are dominant in the established argumentation 
in favour of assistance to developing countries, 
there is a tendency towards presenting aid as a 
manifestation of greater global justice. In the 
same vein, donors’ rhetoric on development 
cooperation puts increasingly more emphasis 
on the enlightened self-interest. Its growing 
prominence is apparent in discussions on se-
curity concerns: poverty is portrayed as a 
threat to prosperity anywhere in the world.  
On the basis of the aforementioned rationales, 
it can be deduced that an effective message in 
support of development cooperation should 
address the following conditions: it should 
show a direct relationship between people’s 
everyday lives; it should build on the links bet-
ween societies; it should expose global interde-
pendencies; and should emphasise reciprocity. 
Motivations  referring to the “common good” 
–rather than sheer altruism and goodwill– can 
be expected to gain ground along with the pro-
gressing impact of globalisation.  
Fostering public support for development coo-
peration requires taking an active approach to 
communicating with the public. Evidence 
from a number of donor countries indicates 
that an informed public, even if critical on cer-
tain aspects, is an ally of official development 
assistance. The range of potential information 
and communication assets which can be ad-
vantageous in this regard includes policy-ma-
kers who engage in public debate on develop-
ment cooperation.  
It should be remembered, however, that provi-
ding facts alone may not be sufficient to secure 
a lasting public commitment to growing aid 
budgets and evolving aid policies. Such com-
mitment requires that people understand a wi-
der context in which development cooperation 
policies are defined, implemented, evaluated, 
and re-defined. Moreover, explaining the need 
for greater development assistance efforts in-
volves challenging perspectives. The aforesaid 
mission can be fulfilled by quality develop-
ment education which attempts to facilitate 
understanding of global development pro-
blems and to change attitudes and behaviours.  
Opportunities for fostering development awa-
reness, and thus support for development 
assistance, in new donors countries can be 
found, for instance, in the strength acquired in 
the relatively novel area of civic and European 
education. Methods and capacities developed 
through intensive civic and European educa-
tion activities can be fairly easily adapted to 
address global issues. Enthusiasm of the youth 
for foreign languages, volunteering, and cul-
tural exchanges is another good promise for 
promoting direct engagement with people in 
the South and better understanding of deve-
lopment problems.  
Through well designed communications on 
development cooperation programmes and de-
velopment education –two separate but com-
plementary fields– donors can endeavour to 
create a virtuous circle, in which aware citi-
zens willingly participate in voluntary action 
in support of development, object to policies 
that perpetuate global poverty and demand 
more and better development assistance.  
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Annex 1  
Millennium development goals  
 
Millennium Development Goals were derived from the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
adopted in September 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly, to be achieved by 2015. 
Alongside the eight goals, a series of time-bound and measurable targets were defined to monitor 
the progress, using 1990 as a benchmark. 
 
GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day 
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education  
Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling 
GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at 
all levels by 2015  
GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality  
Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five  
GOAL 5: Improve maternal health  
Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio  
GOAL 6: Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases  
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases  
GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability  
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; 
reverse loss of environmental resources  
Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020  
GOAL 8: Develop a global partnership for development  
Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and 
non-discriminatory, includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty 
reduction— nationally and internationally 
Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free 
access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; 
cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for 
countries committed to poverty reduction 
Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States 
Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and 
international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term 
In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for 
youth 
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs 
in developing countries 
In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies— 
especially information and communications technologies 
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Annex 2 
Donor ODA spending relative to the national income 
 
 
Table 2 
ODA as percentage of GNI (2005) 
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0.81
0.53
0.52
0.47
0.47
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SOURCE: OECD 2006. 
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Annex 3 
List of acronyms 
 
 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
DEA Development Education Association 
DFID Development for International Development 
EDF  European Development Fund 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HDI Human Development Index 
HDR Human Development Report 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries  
IFI International Financial Institution 
LDC Least Developed Country 
MDG Millennium Development Goal 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NGDO Non Governmental Development Organisation 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
Norad Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
NSA Non-State Actor 
NSC North-South Centre of the Council of Europe 
OA Official Assistance 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD/DAC  
Development Assistance Committee of Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
Sida Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WTO World Trade Organisation  
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